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ESSAY 
LEGAL DIVERSIFICATION 
Kelli A. Alces∗ 
The greatest protection investors have from the risks associated with 
capital investment is diversification. This Essay introduces a new di-
mension of diversification for investors: legal diversification. Legal di-
versification of investment means building a portfolio of securities that 
are governed by a variety of legal rules. Legal diversification protects in-
vestors from the risk that a particular method of minimizing agency costs 
will prove ineffective and allows investors to own securities in a variety 
of firms, with each security governed by the most efficient set of legal 
rules given the circumstances of the investment. Diversification of in-
vestment by legal rules is possible because of the varied menu of legal 
rules firms can choose from when organizing and raising capital.  
This Essay makes several contributions to the literature. By intro-
ducing legal diversification, it reveals a new understanding of how in-
vestors, issuers, and society can benefit from maintaining a variety of le-
gal rules to govern investment in businesses. The corporate law scholar-
ship has long advocated preserving a variety of rules under which firms 
can organize, but it has yet to consider how investors can take ad-
vantage of that variety to protect themselves before market competition 
has revealed the “best” rules. Legal diversification also complements re-
cent literature emphasizing the importance of diversity in financial regu-
lation by highlighting another reason diversity of legal rules is important 
to healthy capital markets. Legal diversification fills gaps in the litera-
ture that advocates regulatory diversity by offering an explanation for 
why that diversity is a valuable protection for investors and an indis-
pensable mechanism for allowing firms to choose the most efficient legal 
rules to govern their organization and operation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Diversification is the best protection investors have from the risks of 
capital investment. Modern portfolio theory requires that investors diver-
sify their holdings by investing in firms whose financial returns are influ-
enced by different factors.1 That usually means investing in firms in 
different industries. The object is to identify the factors that could cause 
a firm’s return to vary from what is expected and to invest in firms that 
                                                                                                                 
1. Modern portfolio theory holds that investors should construct portfolios of 
securities that vary in their returns differently so that the variance of one security does not 
threaten the return of the portfolio as a whole. Such well-diversified portfolios shield 
investors from firm-specific or security-specific risks. See generally Harry M. Markowitz, 
Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification of Investments (2d ed. 1991). 
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differ with regard to those elements of risk. By employing this investment 
strategy, investors can “diversify away” firm-specific risks; that is, they min-
imize their exposure to the risk of loss from one firm’s failure by their 
investment in other, different firms.2 
One of the most significant risks investors confront is the risk that 
firm managers will make poor decisions or appropriate the firm’s capital 
for personal use. These agency costs are governed by different legal rules 
depending on the type of business form the firm adopts or the kind of 
securities it issues. Investors use the legal tools at hand to discipline man-
agers, to seek a remedy when their investments are lost, and to obtain 
information about the firm or its securities. If the applicable legal rules 
are inadequate, investors’ rights in the firm are less valuable. For exam-
ple, public stock and private debt securities offer investors different 
rights to the firm’s assets and different ways to protect their interests in 
the firm. Private general partnerships and public corporations use differ-
ent methods to minimize the agency costs of management, and investors 
protect their interests differently in each business form. Because firms’ 
returns can vary from the expected return according to the legal rules 
they have adopted to minimize agency costs, those legal rules are a useful 
dimension along which investors can diversify. Corporate law scholars 
have long touted the importance of maintaining diversity in the legal 
rules governing businesses.3 Yet, to date, no one has focused on 
diversification among legal rules as an important investment or regula-
                                                                                                                 
2. More technically, an investor limits the variance of her portfolio’s return from the 
expected return through diversification. See infra notes 13–16 and accompanying text 
(discussing modern strategy of diversification). 
3. The benefits of legal diversity in corporate governance include allowing firms to 
choose the legal rules that best suit their needs and allowing jurisdictions to experiment 
with different rules in order to discover which rules are most effective. See Erin A. O’Hara 
& Larry E. Ribstein, The Law Market 107–09 (2009) (noting advantages of market 
competition between states for designing optimal legal rules); Larry E. Ribstein, The Rise 
of the Uncorporation 26–27 (2010) [hereinafter Ribstein, Rise of the Uncorporation] 
(advocating benefits of multiple distinct business association forms for entrepreneurs to 
choose among); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to 
Securities Regulation, 107 Yale L.J. 2359, 2361–62 (1998) [hereinafter Romano, 
Empowering Investors] (arguing states should be able to compete to provide securities 
regulation, just as they compete in designing corporate law statutes); Roberta Romano, 
The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition for Corporate 
Charters, 23 Yale J. on Reg. 209, 210–11 (2006) [hereinafter Romano, The States as a 
Laboratory] (discussing benefits of allowing states to develop different corporate 
governance laws); Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 
323, 326–30 (2011) [hereinafter Whitehead, Destructive Coordination] (arguing 
subjecting financial firms to identical regulations imposes additional risk); Roberta 
Romano, For Diversity in the International Regulation of Financial Institutions: Critiquing 
and Recalibrating the Basel Architecture 3–8 (Yale Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 452, 
2013) [hereinafter Romano, For Diversity], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2127749 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (emphasizing importance of diverse set of legal 
rules to regulate international financial risk).  
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tory priority. By introducing legal diversification, this Essay fills that hole 
in the literature. 
“Legal diversification” is an investment strategy whereby investors 
purchase securities governed by different legal rules in order to diversify 
away the risk that any one set of legal rules will fail to adequately limit 
agency costs. For example, an investor might hold a diversified portfolio 
of stocks in different kinds of public corporations, but that portfolio 
would not necessarily be legally diversified. A portfolio would be legally 
diversified if it contained securities issued by privately held limited liabil-
ity companies (LLCs), public corporations, emerging growth companies 
(EGCs), and various derivatives. By holding a diversified portfolio of in-
vestments in firms and securities governed by different legal regimes and 
regulations, investors can realize the benefits of the best each regime has 
to offer while enjoying protection from its weaknesses. Investing in firms 
with different governance structures and in securities with different legal 
protections is diversifying based on the legal rules governing the invest-
ments in a portfolio. The legal rules governing firms and securities con-
stitute a new dimension for investors to consider when choosing securi-
ties for a well-diversified portfolio. 
This Essay is primarily concerned with legal diversification on two 
planes: regulation of governance within firms and regulation of the secu-
rities those firms and other market participants issue to investors.4 Variety 
in the regulation of firm governance is found in the use of different 
business association forms. Once a firm’s organizers have chosen the law 
governing the management of their firm, they will then choose which 
regulations will govern the securities the firm issues to investors. A firm 
has many options available at the outset, and it can change the legal re-
gimes under which it operates as it progresses from a relatively small, 
                                                                                                                 
4. There is a third very relevant level of regulation: regulation of firms that manage 
investments on behalf of unsophisticated investors. While some of these firms, such as 
mutual funds, have governance structures similar to those of corporations, they rely 
heavily on strong exit rights to protect investors and to provide a market for the services 
provided. See John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance 
and Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 Yale L.J. 84, 88 (2010) (“[Mutual 
fund] [i]nvestors will almost always prefer . . . to use a unique right of exit . . . .”); see also 
William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, One Hat Too Many? Investment 
Desegregation in Private Equity, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 45, 49 (2009) (suggesting “easy exit 
reduces risks for investors . . . and therefore imposes discipline upon fund managers”). 
The Securities and Exchange Commission and various self-regulatory organizations also 
subject mutual funds, broker-dealers, and investment advisors to a variety of regulations 
designed to protect unsophisticated retail investors from the agency costs associated with 
giving someone else open-ended discretion over their savings. See Donald C. Langevoort, 
The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, 95 Va. L. 
Rev. 1025, 1030 (2009) (discussing differences in regulatory oversight between types of 
investment entities). While the regulation of these firms and the agency costs they present 
are important to how retail investors interact with the market, this Essay focuses instead on 
the menu of investment options (monetary and legal) the market provides. 
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fledgling business to a larger, more successful one, or as it endures fi-
nancial distress and reorganizes to try again to succeed as a profitable 
entity. As the firm moves through its life cycle and selects different rules 
to govern its relationships with investors, investors are exposed to differ-
ent kinds of agency costs and use different mechanisms to manage those 
costs. For example, a small, private LLC may have a few attentive owners 
who closely monitor management decisions. When those investors want 
to spread the risk associated with investment in the firm more widely and 
cash out of the firm by incorporating and offering it to the public, public 
reporting requirements will protect new owners; however, they are likely 
to be rationally apathetic and so monitor management much less 
closely.5 There are advantages to both public and private securities, but 
they are different in how the regulatory systems impose different agency 
costs and risks and how they suit firms at different times and under dif-
ferent circumstances.  
Legal rules influence returns because agency costs can affect the 
risk-adjusted return of a particular investment. If managers make poor 
decisions or misappropriate the firm’s funds, investors are harmed. In 
order to be fully protected from the risks of each business form’s failure 
to prevent or redress those harms, but still take advantage of the benefits 
of each legal regime, investors should diversify among the various legal 
rules governing businesses. 
Robust legal diversification will allow investors, companies, and the 
market as a whole to find the right balance of legal protection against the 
inevitable agency costs of the system. If it is uncertain what the most ef-
fective governance mechanisms are, then diversification among various 
governance regimes will protect investors while legal rules take time to 
improve. Diversifying investment across different kinds of firms will cor-
relate to diversification across different economic activities as firms 
choose the legal rules that serve their economic goals most efficiently. 
Legal diversity provides advantages to firms as well. A diverse menu 
of legal regimes can help companies find the right governance or regula-
tory fit for their capital needs, and it allows them to send signals to inves-
tors about the kind of investment they represent. A firm that decides to 
go public is signaling that it is ready for enhanced disclosure obligations 
and monitoring. A firm that is taken private and unincorporated signals 
that it is undergoing reorganization and the current owners intend to 
extract value from the results of the turnaround. A small firm that 
chooses not to go public but still sells securities to institutional investors 
shows that it wants to tap some of the available “public” capital while still 
                                                                                                                 
5. See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Future of Shareholder Democracy, 84 Ind. L.J. 1259, 
1268–69 (2009) (“Rational apathy refers to the notion that the cost to shareholders of 
informing themselves about a particular action and casting a vote in opposition to 
management exceeds the expected or actual benefit gained from such voting.”). 
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choosing a governance form that relies on more direct monitoring by 
equity holders or relies more heavily on management ownership of the 
firm. This signaling allows firms to attract the right kinds of investors 
given their particular governance and capital needs. With a greater menu 
of options, firms can choose the governance structure that best suits 
them while also engaging the capital markets in the most effective way. 
The capital markets as a whole also benefit from the promotion of 
legal diversification. A system that allows firms to use a variety of legal 
regimes benefits from experimenting with different legal rules to see 
what works best in particular circumstances. With a number of firms us-
ing different governance structures, the markets will be able to sort out 
which mechanisms best limit agency costs and then favor those mecha-
nisms when they are most effective. Over time, various governance struc-
tures should grow to offer better protections to investors given the char-
acteristics of a specific firm. Because the capital markets and the busi-
nesses and investors that contribute to them change over time, the law 
must be able to adapt to those changing circumstances. Such evolution-
ary processes require variety in order to adapt to unanticipated changes. 
Legal diversity allows firms and investors to experiment with various legal 
rules to learn more about what works well in certain circumstances. The 
lessons learned from those experiments will help the legal system design 
appropriate responses to new situations as they occur. 
To date, the literature on diversity of legal rules has focused on the 
importance of giving firms the ability to choose among a diverse menu of 
legal rules in order to discover which legal rules are most appealing or 
most efficient.6 For example, each state has its own law governing the 
delegation of rights and responsibilities between shareholders and direc-
tors of a corporation. States compete for firms by trying to provide the 
governance law more managers and investors would prefer. Scholars 
have advocated the expansion of this competition to many areas of the 
law, particularly securities regulation. Roberta Romano has suggested 
modeling state competition for securities law after competition for cor-
porate law by allowing individual states to regulate key elements of secu-
                                                                                                                 
6. See, e.g., Ribstein, Rise of the Uncorporation, supra note 3, at 1–2 (“The 
availability of sets of default rules that fill the contracting gaps can be critical to these 
firms’ success.”); Chris Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Markets for Securities 
Laws, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1435, 1438 (2008) (arguing securities law choices may increase 
competition and reduce transaction costs); Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 3, 
at 2362 (proposing system of “competitive federalism” for securities laws to “produce rules 
more aligned with the preferences of investors”); Romano, For Diversity, supra note 3, at 3 
(supporting flexibility in financial structure “that provides greater room for regulatory 
diversity and experimentation”). 
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rities trading and disclosure.7 Both Romano and Chris Brummer have 
noted the potential benefits of international competition for securities 
listings through securities and banking regulation.8 In this kind of mar-
ket competition, or “law market,” firms must choose to be governed by 
the law of one jurisdiction rather than the law of another. Because more 
firms will choose the jurisdiction with the best law, jurisdictions have in-
centives to make “better” laws. 
The legal diversification advocated here is distinct from the regula-
tory competition essential to law markets. The goal of legal diversification 
is not to find the one set of rules that will be best for all firms. Rather, 
legal diversification relies on the experimentation associated with legal 
diversity and encourages investors to build portfolios of investments that 
sample a variety of legal regimes. Firms subject to different legal rules 
pose different kinds and degrees of agency costs even if they are other-
wise very similar. Legal diversification requires, for example, not only 
that our system have a number of different LLC statutes, but that it main-
tain a population of private LLCs next to, and distinct from, a population 
of public corporations. Allowing firms to move between governance 
forms and securities rules as their circumstances change allows compa-
nies and investors alike to find the best ways to strike the right balance of 
minimizing agency costs and raising capital over time.9 It is a diversifica-
tion that leads to better law and investment outcomes not by forcing reg-
ulators to compete to discover the optimal business form or governance 
rules, but by finding yet another way to keep investors and the legal sys-
tem from putting all of their eggs in one (potentially flawed) basket. To 
that end, legal diversification is a complement to a relatively new trend in 
the literature that argues that the financial markets may be more vulner-
able to systemic risk if all financial firms are forced to comply with identi-
cal regulations.10 Diversity that allows legal rules to evolve and adapt to 
changing circumstances is valuable and is an important mechanism for 
protecting investors from the consequences of flawed, or ineffective, le-
gal rules. 
                                                                                                                 
7. Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 3, at 2361–62 (proposing states should 
regulate securities registration and create related continuous disclosure regime for issuers 
and suggesting antifraud provisions to enforce system). 
8. Brummer, supra note 6, at 1438 (noting international competition for securities 
laws makes foreign venues more attractive to issuers and reduces transaction costs of 
switching jurisdictions); Romano, For Diversity, supra note 3, at 3–8 (proposing framework 
for regulatory diversity in international financial system). 
9. See infra Parts III, IV. 
10. See Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, supra note 3, at 327 (“[A]lthough 
regulation and market standards can help reduce systemic risk, they themselves can also 
become a systemic risk.” (footnote omitted)); Romano, For Diversity, supra note 3, at 101 
(“[E]xperience indicates that . . . harmonization has increased, rather than decreased, 
systemic risk . . . .”). 
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Part I of this Essay explains what legal diversification is and how legal 
diversity benefits firms, investors, and the capital markets. Part II argues 
that the public corporation is a “sticky default” and explains how that can 
threaten the advantages we realize from legal diversity. In particular, it 
points to provisions of the new Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act 
(JOBS Act) that may, alternatively, expand or hinder legal diversity. Part 
III reveals the diverse menu of business forms available to organizing 
firms and explains how diversification among these forms can protect 
investors from agency costs. Part IV examines the menu of securities laws 
from which issuers may select when raising capital. It shows that investors 
can find protection in each form of security, but gain maximum protec-
tion by diversifying among the available choices. Together, Parts III and 
IV demonstrate how important legal diversification is to investors, issuers, 
and society, and why maintaining diverse legal rules should be a priority 
for investors and regulators. Part V situates legal diversification within the 
current literature on diversity of legal rules and shows that while legal 
diversification is a new and distinct concept, it fits within a well-devel-
oped body of work that advocates the benefits of maintaining a variety of 
legal rules to govern the firms that animate the capital markets. Finally, 
Part VI considers the policy implications of legal diversity.  
I. WHAT IS LEGAL DIVERSIFICATION? 
Legal diversification is an investment strategy that contemplates di-
versifying investment in securities by choosing securities that are gov-
erned by different legal rules. There is a rich diversity of legal rules gov-
erning the securities traded in American markets.11 One need not look to 
foreign markets to find alternative regulatory regimes. For example, an 
investor could purchase equity interests in a public corporation and a 
private LLC, and the legal rules governing her rights in those firms and 
protecting her interests in those assets could differ substantially.12 Legal 
diversification is analogous to investment diversification, which focuses 
on selecting securities that are likely to vary from their expected returns 
at different times for different reasons, but it is not identical to invest-
ment diversification. That is, the justifications for investment diversifica-
tion and legal diversification do not map perfectly onto one another. 
Understanding why legal diversification can be valuable to investment, 
and even investment return, can help scholars better understand invest-
                                                                                                                 
11. See John C. Coates IV, Private vs. Political Choice of Securities Regulation: A 
Political Cost/Benefit Analysis, 41 Va. J. Int’l L. 531, 550–53 (2001) (discussing high 
degree of tailoring among Securities and Exchange Commission disclosure and 
accounting regimes). 
12. American investors can also invest in foreign markets, as determined by 
governing legal rules, which adds further to the diversity of securities available for 
investment. 
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ment and order laws to encourage, rather than discourage, diversity of 
legal form.  
This Part explains what legal diversification is and how it relates to 
traditional notions of investment diversification from modern portfolio 
theory. Rather than finding a direct analogy, this Part highlights a useful 
way of understanding the benefits investors can realize from legal diver-
sity and also explains why legal diversity is beneficial to issuers and soci-
ety.  
A. The Diversification Analogy  
Investment diversification refers to assembling a portfolio of securi-
ties that lowers variance, bringing actual return as close as possible to 
expected return.13 This requires bringing together securities with low 
covariance, that is, securities that are not likely to vary from expected 
returns together or for the same reason.14 Harry Markowitz launched 
modern portfolio theory with these observations about the benefits of 
diversification and how it should be achieved.15 He emphasized diversify-
ing “across industries because firms in different industries, especially in-
dustries with different economic characteristics, have lower covariances 
than firms within an industry.”16 Investment diversification focuses, then, 
on risk and variance from expected return. Different businesses can vary 
independently, so an investor can compile a portfolio of securities that 
limits overall variance by limiting covariance. 
A common example of investment diversification is a portfolio that 
contains stock in a company selling sunglasses and stock in a company 
selling umbrellas.17 Suppose that if it rains, the expected return of the 
sunglasses business is $20, but the expected return of the umbrella busi-
                                                                                                                 
13. See Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. Fin. 77, 79 (1952) [hereinafter 
Markowitz, Portfolio Selection Article] (describing investment diversification as “rule 
which implies both that the investor should diversify and that he should maximize 
expected return”). 
14. See id. at 89 (“It is necessary to avoid investing in securities with high covariances 
among themselves.”). 
15. See José Martin Jara, What Is the Correct Standard of Prudence in Employer 
Stock Cases?, 45 J. Marshall L. Rev. 541, 571 (2012) (“In 1952, economist Harry M. 
Markowitz changed the theory and practice of investment management by publishing his 
groundbreaking article ‘Portfolio Selection.’”); Karl S. Okamoto & Douglas O. Edwards, 
Risk Taking, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 159, 194 n.148 (2010) (stating Markowitz “deriv[ed] the 
first formal diversification principles” (citing Markowitz, Portfolio Selection Article, supra 
note 13)). In 1990, Markowitz won the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for his 
significant contributions to modern portfolio theory. Harry M. Markowitz—Facts, 
Nobelprize.org, www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1990/
markowitz-facts.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Oct. 9, 2013). 
16. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection Article, supra note 13, at 89. 
17. A slightly different version of this example appears in Stephen J. Choi & A.C. 
Pritchard, Securities Regulation: Cases and Analysis 21–22 (3d ed. 2012). 
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ness is $100. Conversely, if it is sunny, the expected return of the sun-
glasses business is $100, but the expected return of the umbrella business 
is $20. If an investor only invested in one of the businesses, the expected 
return for her portfolio would be $60, assuming it rains half the time and 
the sun shines half of the time.18 But suppose it rains 80% of the time 
one year and the sun only shines 20% of the time. If the investor has only 
invested in the sunglasses business, her return for the year would be 
$36,19 but an investor who owns stock in the umbrella business would 
enjoy an $84 return.20 An investor who divided her investment equally 
between the two firms would enjoy a return of $60,21 the expected return 
for each portfolio assuming it rained and the sun shone an equal num-
ber of days. The diversified portfolio is thereby protected from each 
firm’s variance from the expected return and realizes the expected re-
turn for the portfolio even though the weather did not behave as ex-
pected. This is an oversimplified example, but it demonstrates the goals 
and benefits of investment diversification.  
To be sure, legal diversification is not as easily described in numeri-
cal terms and involves many more moving parts (that move other parts, 
which, in turn, move other parts that might result in differences in in-
vestment return). Legal rules do not as directly influence the return of a 
given security or the overall profitability of a business. But legal rules can 
and do affect the profitability of firms; having the right legal rules for the 
right kind of business or at the right time in a firm’s life cycle is vitally 
important to raising capital, operating a healthy business, or reviving a 
struggling business. The intuition that investments in different kinds of 
firms can shield an investor from the failures of one firm also rings true 
in the legal diversification analogy and lends important insights to in-
vestment strategy. Law is simply another dimension, among many, across 
which investors can diversify. 
1. Law Matters. —  The corporate governance of a firm can affect the 
actual return on a given security. Weak accountability for managers can 
lead to careless management and poor decisionmaking. It can also lead 
to the kind of self-dealing or misappropriation of corporate assets that 
most governance laws aim to prevent. Weak governance mechanisms do 
not guarantee that managers will perform poorly or faithlessly, of course, 
but there is an increased risk of bad management where accountability is 
weak. 
With this connection in mind, scholars have conducted numerous 
studies testing the effectiveness of various governance mechanisms by 
                                                                                                                 
18. $20(.5) + $100(.5) = $60 
19. $20(.8) + $100(.2) = $36 
20. $20(.2) + $100(.8) = $84 
21. $36(.5) + $84(.5) = $60, which is the expected return of each individual 
investment. 
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looking at both their ability to detect problems within the firm and by 
looking at the returns of firms that have employed particular governance 
mechanisms. For example, Sanjai Bhagat and Bernard Black conducted 
an empirical study in which they tried to determine whether the inde-
pendence of a firm’s board positively or negatively affected its financial 
performance.22 They found that there is no evidence that majority-inde-
pendent boards correlate to greater profitability, but found that firms 
with a few inside directors were more profitable than those with superma-
jority-independent boards.23 That study suggests that board independ-
ence is not the panacea that regulators think it could be, and that board 
composition matters to firm success. Other studies have shown that there 
is a strong correlation between independent boards and accurate finan-
cial reporting.24 Further, there is evidence showing a correlation between 
the strong securities regulations supporting public markets and greater 
profitability in those markets than in markets that lack strong mandatory 
disclosure rules and insider trading prohibitions.25 This evidence suggests 
that laws intended to protect investors from the misdeeds of manage-
ment impact the profitability of those firms and matter to the health of 
the markets in which investors risk their capital. 
Somewhat more controversially, some scholars have tried to prove 
empirically the degree of efficiency of various corporate law rules.26 
Known as “law and finance,” this line of scholarship compares U.S. cor-
porate and securities laws with legal regimes in other countries with re-
                                                                                                                 
22. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board 
Composition and Firm Performance, 54 Bus. Law. 921, 921–22 (1999). 
23. Id. at 950. 
24. See Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack Corporate 
Governance: How Wise Is the Received Wisdom?, 95 Geo. L.J. 1843, 1869–70 (2007) 
(citing several empirical studies showing increased board independence decreases 
financial reporting fraud by firms). 
25. See id. at 1858–60 (citing Frank B. Cross & Robert A. Prentice, Law and 
Corporate Finance 152–89 (2007)) (discussing empirical studies indicating capital markets 
are improved by vigorous securities regulation). 
26. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. Pol. Econ. 1113, 1113 
(1998) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Law and Finance] (investigating effect of strength of 
investor protections on dispersion of share ownership in forty-nine countries and finding 
countries with weaker protections have more concentrated share ownership); Rafael La 
Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. Fin. 1131, 1131 (1997) 
[hereinafter La Porta et al., Legal Determinants] (finding countries with weak investor 
protections have smaller capital markets than those with more robust corporate 
governance laws); Brian R. Cheffins, Does Law Matter?: The Separation of Ownership and 
Control in the United Kingdom 37–38 (Univ. of Cambridge, ESRC Ctr. for Bus. Research, 
Working Paper No. 172, 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=245560 (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review) (examining connection between market regulation and rise of 
separation of ownership from control in United Kingdom and United States during 
twentieth century and concluding “law matters” thesis was neither conclusively proven nor 
effectively dismissed). 
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gard to their ability to protect investors.27 The premise of the law and fi-
nance project is that investors will not contribute capital to companies if 
they think the law poorly protects their rights in the firm.28 Law and fi-
nance studies have found that firms tend to be owned by a smaller, more 
concentrated group of shareholders when investor protections are weak 
and that markets governed by laws that provide only weak investor pro-
tections tend to be smaller.29 Those findings make sense because when a 
legal system provides fewer investor protections, investors have to moni-
tor managers more closely and cannot indulge in the rational apathy 
widely dispersed shareholding allows. It would seem, then, that legal 
rules significantly influence investors’ choices. If legal protections matter 
to investors, then investors must believe they affect returns. If legal rules 
can affect returns, then they can cause actual returns to vary from ex-
pected returns and are therefore a good candidate for diversification. 
The effort to establish the relevance of legal rules to returns has 
been strongly criticized, however. Scholars have noted weaknesses in cod-
ing the legal rules of the different countries30 and endogeneity problems 
have plagued the project.31 It is very difficult to prove that any one legal 
                                                                                                                 
27. See La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 26, at 1115–17 (documenting 
law and finance research method as comparing legal regimes in multiple countries); 
Alessio M. Pacces, How Does Corporate Law Matter? ‘Law and Finance’ and Beyond 6–7 
(June 18, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2260340 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing law and finance scholarship as 
comparing different corporate governance systems). 
28. Pacces, supra note 27, at 5–6 (explaining theory that “when . . . legal constraints 
are insufficient to discipline the managers’ conflicts of interest with the shareholders, 
separation of ownership and control will be impaired”); see also La Porta et al., Law and 
Finance, supra note 26, at 1114 (“Law and the quality of its enforcement are potentially 
important determinants of what rights security holders have and how well these rights are 
protected. Since the protection investors receive determines their readiness to finance 
firms, corporate finance may critically turn on these legal rules and their enforcement.”). 
29. La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 26, at 1146–48; La Porta et al., Legal 
Determinants, supra note 26, at 1149. 
30. See Pacces, supra note 27, at 10 (“The most serious issue in coding is 
inconsistency as, for instance, default rules received different scores depending on the 
jurisdiction.”); see also Holger Spamann, ‘Law and Finance’ Revisited 21 (Harvard Law 
Sch., John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus. Fellows’ Discussion Paper No. 12, 2008), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1095526 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(finding when coding is corrected, conclusions of Law and Finance study do not hold); 
Holger Spamann, On the Insignificance and/or Endogeneity of La Porta et al.’s ‘Anti-
Director Rights Index’ Under Consistent Coding 69 (Harvard Law Sch., John M. Olin Ctr. 
for Law, Econ. & Bus. Fellows’ Discussion Paper No. 7, 2006) [hereinafter Spamann, 
Insignificance and/or Endogeneity], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=894301 (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding coding errors in numerous empirical studies 
over last ten years).  
31. When the direction of causation is unclear, that is, it is difficult or impossible to 
determine whether one event caused or was caused by another event that occurs 
coincidentally, then one would say the two events are endogenous to one another. Is a 
pedestrian crossing the street in front of a car because it stopped, or did it stop because 
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rule affects returns or influences investment decisions because choice of 
legal rules is often endogenous to other characteristics of the firm such 
as its age, capitalization, and the concentration of its ownership. This en-
dogeneity problem makes it difficult to be sure that an empiricist is 
measuring only the effect of the legal rule on returns. The precise effects 
of legal rules are extremely difficult to isolate from other factors affecting 
a firm’s fortunes. Therefore, the “law matters” thesis has been difficult to 
prove empirically. Still, most of the critiques of the project have been 
aimed at the effort to rank corporate governance laws rather than the 
basic premise that law matters. There is life remaining in the “law mat-
ters” thesis, though it remains unproven. 
Most legal scholars land somewhere between believing that law is the 
dominant force behind corporate governance success and investor pro-
tection and believing that law does not matter at all—they begin from an 
understanding that law is not all that matters, but it is still an important 
factor affecting firms.32 Other factors affect a firm’s fortunes, including 
the characteristics of its industry, its ability to produce and market desir-
able products, and its managerial skills. The law cannot protect investors 
from failures on those measures. But the law matters. It affects the 
choices firms make. It affects their ability to raise capital and the cost of 
that capital. If investors were offered no legal protections, they would 
either refuse to invest or would demand more concessions before invest-
                                                                                                                 
she looked like she was going to cross the street? In determining whether legal rules affect 
returns, one must first figure out if legal rules caused a governance practice that led to a 
difference in return or if the law was a response to a prevalent governance practice. 
Holger Spamann discusses endogeneity problems with some of the law and finance studies 
by pointing out that a particular governance practice may be more carefully restricted 
where it is more common and there may be no law regarding that practice at all where 
firms tend not to engage in that practice. Spamann, Insignificance and/or Endogeneity, 
supra note 30, at 12–13, 17. In determining how a particular business form affects 
governance practice or returns, endogeneity may pose difficulties. Does the fact that 
partnerships allow more involvement from owners cause partnerships to have lower 
agency costs than public corporations? Or do people who want to actively participate in a 
business they start with people they know well, and so pose a low risk of agency costs, tend 
to choose the partnership form because it is more convenient for them? The endogeniety 
of the choice of governance to other characteristics of the firm makes it difficult to reach 
conclusions about the direction of causation when evaluating the effectiveness of legal 
rules. 
32. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global 
Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 641, 644–
51 (1999) (noting many forces allowing shareholder dispersion to dominate U.S. system, 
but not necessarily capital markets in other countries); Katharina Pistor, Law in Finance, 
41 J. Comp. Econ. 311, 311 (2013) (“There will always be some debate as to whether a 
specific law or regulation distorts or supports markets, but few would argue today that law 
is irrelevant to financial markets or that they could operate entirely outside it.”); Cheffins, 
supra note 26, at 39 (“[O]ne must exercise caution before concluding that the law will be 
irrelevant to any future transition towards American-style corporate governance.”). 
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ing. The degree of legal protection is, therefore, important to investors 
and firms. 
2. Diversification as a Useful Framework. — If choices about business 
form and what securities to issue can affect return, then the returns gen-
erated, or costs incurred, can vary differently. Legal diversification avoids 
covariance on the basis of legal rules; that is, the returns firms realize as a 
consequence of the legal rules they are subject to vary from the expected 
return in different directions and magnitudes. By legally diversifying, an 
investor avoids covariance based on business form, incentives for man-
agement, means of disciplining management, and business outcomes 
linked to managerial incentives and discipline. Legal diversification also 
avoids covariance based on the choices firms make when they are at par-
ticular points in their life cycles. Investing in a young startup exposes an 
investor to greater risk, but also greater possible return, than investing in 
publicly traded stock. In times of financial distress, it may be better to 
invest in private equity firms that are taking public firms private to reor-
ganize them than to only be a shareholder in publicly traded firms that 
are weathering the storm or filing for bankruptcy. Legal diversification 
also allows a single investor to observe the efficacy of different legal re-
gimes.  
The analogy to the investment diversification of modern portfolio 
theory is not a perfect one. All LLCs will not necessarily fail together, nor 
will even all LLCs in a particular jurisdiction. Of course, managerial mis-
feasance is a firm-specific risk, and managers operating firms under good 
legal rules may choose to cheat while those operating firms under more 
lax rules may remain honest. The fact remains that firms rarely, if ever, 
sink or swim on apposite legal regime alone. Indeed, one may realize 
many potential benefits of legal diversification by diversifying on the basis 
of asset class or simply by firm. An investor diversifies by asset class by in-
vesting in both debt and equity. This is also legal diversification because 
debt and equity are governed by different legal rules.33 An investor can 
diversify away a firm-specific risk, such as managerial failure, by investing 
in different firms, and would not necessarily have to legally diversify to be 
protected from the risk of one manager’s misbehavior. 
Nevertheless, investment diversification provides a useful analogy 
and a helpful framework. Dishonest managers could indeed systemati-
cally exploit a loophole in a substandard governance regime. Some legal 
rules could carry harmful unintended consequences or create perverse 
incentives. For example, the use of option compensation has been 
blamed for contributing to the excessive risktaking that precipitated the 
                                                                                                                 
33. See infra Part IV.C (discussing importance of legal diversification and legal rules 
governing public debt). 
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financial crisis.34 Similarly, government support of the creditors of finan-
cial institutions has removed the incentives those creditors might have to 
monitor, and so made financial institutions more vulnerable to manage-
rial self-interest and risktaking.35 In those instances, it is fortunate that all 
businesses are not operating under the same harmful rules. It is useful, 
then, to have more than one set of rules that investors can choose 
among. Even if investment diversification does not map perfectly onto 
legal diversification, it provides a useful way to think about legal rules in 
making investment decisions. Legal diversification is coincident to in-
vestment diversification in most instances, but is distinct from investment 
diversification. It should be honored as a separate investment priority 
and regulators should promote legal diversity in order to support diversi-
fication.  
B. Benefits to Issuers and Society 
The legal diversity that allows legal diversification of investments also 
benefits issuers and society. It allows issuers to choose the legal regime 
that fits their firms and capital needs most efficiently. It thereby provides 
investors a diverse set of firms to invest in and a diverse set of rights in 
those firms. That diversity helps investors to construct portfolios that par-
ticipate in many potentially profitable securities with differing risk pro-
files and to invest in firms at different points in their life cycles, as those 
various stages bring distinct risks and benefits. Society then benefits from 
the efficiency and profitability gained by the choices issuers and investors 
can make. 
                                                                                                                 
34. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: 
Focusing and Committing to the Long-Term, 26 Yale J. on Reg. 359, 359–60 (2009) 
(“Executive compensation . . . has moved from the agenda of shareholder activists and 
media commentators to that of the federal government, in the ongoing financial 
crisis . . . .”); Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive 
Compensation for Risk Regulation, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1205, 1206 (2011) (“Policy analysts 
have decried the role of executive compensation in promoting excessive risk taking 
leading up to the financial crisis. . . .”); David I. Walker, The Challenge of Improving the 
Long-Term Focus of Executive Pay, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 435, 435–36 (2010) (“A key complaint 
is that executive compensation is insufficiently focused on the long term, leading to 
reckless, short-term decision making by executives, and, at the extreme, financial bubbles 
that inevitably burst . . . .”). 
35. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 Geo. L.J. 
247, 251 (2010) (“[B]ank creditors do not have strong incentives to protect themselves 
because they are at least partly protected—explicitly or implicitly—by the government.”); 
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation in Financial 
Firms: The Case for Convertible Equity-Based Pay, 2012 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 834, 836 
(“The prospect of government rescue lowers the cost of capital for large financial firms, 
increases the resources they deploy, and thus exacerbates the systemic harm of their 
failure.”). 
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Issuers enjoy many advantages in a system that allows different legal 
rules to flourish. Most importantly, a firm is able to choose the legal rules 
that allow it to operate its business most efficiently. Its managers can 
choose a set of legal rules that offers investors the protections they de-
mand and also allows the managers to run the firm with the appropriate 
degree of freedom of action or risktaking given their business goals. It 
allows managers to choose precisely how to raise capital and what re-
strictions will apply to that fund-raising. There is a lengthy and well-
known literature arguing that different businesses have different needs 
and encounter different circumstances and so should be able to choose 
the laws to which they are subject.36 The variety issuers have in choosing 
the governance rules for their business, as well as the various ways they 
can choose to raise capital, allows them to choose efficient rules not just 
once, but continuously over the lifespan of the firm.  
The case that legal diversification benefits society and capital mar-
kets as a whole is consistent with the arguments in favor of law markets, 
and specifically the argument that diversity promotes evolution to better 
legal rules.37 A society and legal system are more likely to find better legal 
rules if they are able to try different methods of limiting agency costs and 
then tweak those methods over time. Legal diversity allows trials of these 
different legal rules at the same time in similar contexts. The “state la-
boratories” justification for using state law to govern the internal affairs 
of corporations—that the fifty states can each try different legal rules 
and, over time, learn which rules are most efficient and effective—ap-
plies to diversity throughout the legal system.38 Just as comparing the cor-
porate laws of Nevada and Delaware might reveal something about which 
legal rules are most effective, comparing corporate governance and LLC 
governance may prove similarly instructive. The creative negotiation of 
                                                                                                                 
36. See D. Gordon Smith et al., Private Ordering with Shareholder Bylaws, 80 
Fordham L. Rev. 125, 128 (2011) (describing “discriminating alignment hypothesis” view 
that, based on transaction cost economics, different firms have different attributes 
requiring different governance structures); see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. 
Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1416, 1417–18 (1989) (“No one set of 
terms will be best for all; hence the ‘enabling’ structure of corporate law.”); Larry E. 
Ribstein, Commentary, Efficiency, Regulation and Competition: A Comment on 
Easterbrook & Fischel’s Economic Structure of Corporate Law, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 254, 265 
(1992) (acknowledging presumptive efficiency of Easterbrook and Fischel’s private 
ordering analysis of corporate governance). 
37. It is through the independent actions of many different firms that one discovers 
which methods of business organization survive. The surviving firms have engaged in 
behaviors the environment—in this case, the market—has “selected” or “adopted.” See 
Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. Pol. Econ. 211, 
214 (1950) (“More common types, the survivors, may appear to be those having adapted 
themselves to the environment, whereas the truth may well be that the environment has 
adopted them.”). 
38. See Romano, The States as a Laboratory, supra note 3, at 210 (discussing “states 
as a laboratory” practice in corporate law). 
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preferred stock terms may demonstrate what rights and powers best pro-
tect investors, and that might reveal something about what bond cove-
nants or shareholder rights should look like.  
By acknowledging the importance of legal diversity to issuers and in-
vestors and making it a priority in structuring legal rules, the legal system 
will promote rules that encourage instead of undermine legal diversity, 
which will make markets function more efficiently and effectively and 
thereby benefit society as a whole. The looming threat to legal diversity is 
the regulatory push toward public corporation status. The next Part ex-
plains how the current legal regime may push companies to become pub-
lic corporations and describes how that could threaten the benefits from 
legal diversity. 
II. THE PUBLIC CORPORATION AS A STICKY DEFAULT 
Corporate law is dominated by default rules that firms can choose 
among when deciding how to organize or raise capital.39 Those organiz-
ing firms can choose among various business forms and once they have 
chosen a business form, the law provides default and mandatory rules to 
govern the rights and responsibilities of the firms’ owners and managers. 
Default rules are essentially optional contract terms provided by statute. 
A firm can adopt a default rule or contract around it by designing a spe-
cific rule that will suit its purposes better. A security is a contract between 
an issuer and an investor regarding the kind and degree of the investor’s 
contribution to the firm’s capital, the rights the investor will have against 
the firm’s assets, and the ability of the investor to enforce those rights. 
Securities regulation provides some default terms for those agreements, 
but those regulatory terms are focused mainly on requiring firms to 
make particular disclosures to investors. This Part focuses on one default 
rule in particular: the rule that requires firms issuing securities to file a 
registration statement, which in turn requires them to comply with pub-
lic reporting requirements, unless they abide by an exception to the de-
fault.40 Because “legal gymnastics” are required to avoid this public status, 
public corporation status can properly be considered a sticky, or difficult-
to-avoid, default.41 Using a sticky default to funnel firms into public 
                                                                                                                 
39. Default rules are “rules that parties can contract around by prior agreement.” Ian 
Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of 
Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87, 87 (1989). 
40. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012); Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 § 12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l, 78o. 
41. Robert B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-Private 
Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital-Raising 3–4 (Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Pub. Law 
& Legal Theory Research Paper No. 12-119, 2012) [hereinafter Thompson & Langevoort, 
Redrawing], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2132813 (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (describing legal gymnastics required under Securities Exchange Act to avoid 
public status). 
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corporation status may compromise the very diversity that is necessary to 
allow investors to legally diversify. This Part explains the public corpora-
tion sticky default and then argues that making the default stickier may 
harm investors by limiting legal diversity, and so limiting the ability to 
legally diversify. 
A. Sticky Default 
Ian Ayres has described a framework that explains the legal rules to 
which firms subject themselves as default contract terms along a contin-
uum between optional and mandatory.42 First, he notes that regulators 
give contracting parties explicit choices, or legal options, for ordering 
their relationship.43 A firm and its investors are contracting parties trying 
to order their relationship in a way sanctioned by law. Those regulating 
business organizations, including state legislatures, Congress, and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), publish the menus from 
which investors and issuers may choose their default terms and also pro-
vide methods for those firms to opt out of particular default choices—
mechanisms he calls “altering rules.”44 The menu choices and the alter-
ing rules are clearly visible to the contracting parties.45  
Because the parties have choices, and altering rules exist, not all 
terms are mandatory, but some are more mandatory than others. Ayres 
describes “sticky defaults” as being quasi-mandatory rules that regulators 
adopt to protect either the contracting parties themselves or third parties 
who may be vulnerable to negative externalities resulting from the con-
tract.46 A sticky default is costly to alter because regulators want parties to 
choose the default.47  
In securities regulation, public corporation status is a sticky default.48 
A company does not have to be a public corporation to raise capital, but 
public corporation status has become a default that is difficult to opt out 
of.49 Any firm that wants to issue securities must file a registration state-
ment with the SEC unless it meets an exception.50 Opting out of that de-
fault requires significant planning, not only in ordering the initial trans-
                                                                                                                 
42. Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 Yale 
L.J. 2032, 2049–53, 2084–96 (2012). 
43. Id. at 2049–53. 
44. Id. at 2036. 
45. This set of circumstances falls within the top left quadrant of Ayres’s table 
describing “Permutations of Menu and Altering Rule Disclosure.” Id. at 2052 tbl.3. 
46. Id. at 2084. 
47. Id. 
48. See Brett H. McDonnell, Sticky Defaults and Altering Rules in Corporate Law, 60 
SMU L. Rev. 383, 429–31 (2007) (describing difficulties associated with choosing not to 
become reporting company or to cease being reporting company). 
49. Id. 
50. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g), 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (2012). 
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action, but in maintaining the firm’s operations in such a way that the 
exception continues to apply.51  
Filing a registration statement is one way to enter the mandatory 
public reporting regime52 wherein a firm has to make significant, manda-
tory disclosures to the market at regular intervals. Firms also incur public 
reporting obligations by growing to a certain size53 or by listing on a na-
tional exchange.54 But the choice to take on public reporting status is not 
permanent. Firms can “go dark” by falling below thresholds relating to 
their size.55 If a firm goes dark, it only avoids public company status as 
long as it stays below the relevant thresholds. If it again grows beyond 
those thresholds by, for example, having too many beneficial sharehold-
ers and too many assets, it must again begin meeting the public reporting 
requirements.56 Thus, public company status may properly be considered 
a sticky default because it is easy to fall into and difficult to stay out of for 
large or growing companies. Of course, many companies opt out of the 
default, but only with very careful planning.  
One clear message of the public company default is that all compa-
nies should be public companies once they grow big enough.57 While 
there is sound reasoning behind this stance,58 it may eventually prove 
costly if it ends up funneling the wrong firms into public company status. 
Sticky defaults are justified where there are sufficient paternalism and 
externality concerns to justify pushing contracting parties toward a pro-
tective default.59 However, opt-out should be preserved for contracting 
parties that do not pose those risks.60 Congress and the SEC prefer public 
company status and public reporting because of the relatively significant 
                                                                                                                 
51. Id. (describing thresholds at which firm must enter public reporting system). 
52. Id. 
53. Under section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act, a firm must comply with 
public reporting requirements if it has (1) more than 499 unaccredited investors, or at 
least 2,000 total investors, and (2) more than $10 million in assets. Id. 
54. § 78l(a). 
55. Firms are exempt if they have fewer than 300 shareholders, or fewer than 500 
shareholders and less than $10 million in assets for three years. § 78l(g)(1)(A), (g)(4); 17 
C.F.R. § 240.12g-4 (2013). 
56. § 78l(g). 
57. See Michael D. Guttentag, Patching a Hole in the JOBS Act: How and Why to 
Rewrite the Rules That Require Firms to Make Periodic Disclosures, 88 Ind. L.J. 151, 166–
70 (2013) (discussing history of amendments to securities laws requiring registration by 
issuers meeting asset size and shareholder thresholds). 
58. See id. at 193–94 (stating one motive of securities law was to “mitigate the harms 
to society that might otherwise be caused by large, unregulated firms”).  
59. See Ayres, supra note 42, at 2084 (describing standard justifications for 
mandatory restrictions on freedom to contract). 
60. See id. at 2088 (“The goal of impeding altering rules will be to disproportionately 
block the more socially problematic opt-outs, while not blocking the less socially 
problematic opt-outs.”). 
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paternalism and externality concerns occasioned by an investing public 
made up of investors facing collective action problems and informational 
asymmetries that prevent them from exercising significant control over 
issuers.61  
B. When Is the Default Appropriate? 
Regulators may be paternalistically worried about widely dispersed, 
rationally apathetic investors for several reasons.62 Investors in large pub-
lic firms are at an informational disadvantage because they rely on the 
firms’ managers to keep them apprised of the success or failure of the 
businesses in which they invest. They have neither the time nor inclina-
tion to monitor those investments carefully because they are well diversi-
fied and protected by liquid public trading markets. Further, those inves-
tors are not able to coordinate to negotiate for disclosures from man-
agement because they are widely dispersed and coordination would be 
difficult and expensive. Unrepresented retail investors may also be signif-
icantly less sophisticated in business and investment matters than the is-
suers of the securities they are buying. Even though mutual funds are 
more sophisticated and better able to coordinate with each other to 
monitor management, they often find that attention to individual com-
panies is not an efficient use of their resources.63 They pay more atten-
tion to maintaining well-diversified portfolios and moving their substan-
tial funds on news of trouble than to the relative success of individual 
firms.64 For these reasons, regulators fear that investors in large compa-
nies with widely dispersed, relatively unsophisticated shareholders cannot 
                                                                                                                 
61. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Precommitment Strategies in Corporate Law: The 
Case of Dead Hand and No Hand Pills, 29 J. Corp. L. 1, 29–30 (2003) (noting 
shareholders often follow “Wall Street Rule”—it is easier to sell stocks than to attempt to 
influence decisionmaking—because they suffer from collective action problems and lack 
incentives to gather information necessary to participate in active decisionmaking); see 
also Ayres, supra note 42, at 2086 (noting paternalism and concerns about negative 
externalities may cause lawmakers to implement “sticky defaults” that make it difficult for 
companies to opt out of altering rules); Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, 
“Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 Geo. L.J. 337, 
377–79 (2013) [hereinafter Langevoort & Thompson, “Publicness”] (describing 
governmental motivations for public reporting requirements). 
62. See supra note 5 (defining rational apathy). 
63. See Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional 
Shareholder Activism, 79 Geo. L.J. 445, 473–74 (1991) (arguing fund managers for 
institutional investors do not have incentives to cooperate with one another because they 
compete for investors and thus are not interested in investing much in helping the whole). 
Institutional investors who would qualify as “accredited investors” face similar incentives 
and often delegate tasks such as voting the stock they hold. But these accredited investors 
are able to invest in private companies, so they are not the subjects of concern justifying 
the use of a sticky default.  
64. See id. (discussing passive money managers’ lack of incentives to “engage in 
actions that improve the performance of widely diversified funds across the board”). 
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be counted on to negotiate for the protections and disclosures they need 
and so must be protected by mandatory regulation, or at least by a de-
fault that becomes quite sticky when investors are expected to be particu-
larly vulnerable. 
Large public companies can also impose externalities on the rest of 
the market when they contribute to systemic risk or defraud investors.65 
In addition to those who trade directly in an issuer’s securities, antifraud 
legislation allows those who trade in derivatives whose value is affected by 
the value of the issuer’s securities to have standing to sue in the face of 
material misstatements.66 The collapse of a major company in a fraud 
scandal can have negative effects on the rest of the industry or the mar-
ket as a whole.67 To the extent companies and investments are inter-
twined in an increasingly close-knit investment community, the threat of 
fraud or a lack of clear, accurate disclosure can affect the market and 
investors beyond those who have directly purchased the offending is-
suer’s securities. The threat of these externalities may justify making 
mandatory disclosure and regular reporting (subject to accuracy review 
and liability) a sticky default for issuers and investors. 
Smaller firms have other ways to protect their investors; they must,  
otherwise they would have trouble attracting and keeping investors. 
Smaller, private firms are often more closely monitored by their investors 
                                                                                                                 
65. See Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an 
Analytical Framework, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1349, 1355 (2011) (noting financial system 
is highly interconnected, meaning transmission of risk amongst “network” of institutions 
can potentially lead to systemic collapse); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After 
Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond 
Oversight, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 795, 797–800 (2011) (describing “too big to fail” 
phenomenon that led many firms prior to 2008 financial crisis to take on high risk and 
leverage, and how it contributed to systemic risk). 
66. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012) (applying 
market manipulation provisions to swap agreements to same extent as they apply to 
securities); 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (setting out securities reporting requirements designed to 
protect investors); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013) (including within scope of insider 
trading regulation all instruments, including derivatives, covered by 15 U.S.C. § 78j). 
67. See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 
Stan. L. Rev. 1, 12 (2003) (“Immediately after the Enron and WorldCom scandals in the 
United States, the net volume of money flowing into mutual funds actually turned 
negative . . . even though the holders of diversified mutual funds are unlikely to suffer any 
significant reduction in their returns from fraud at any particular company.”); see also 
Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 65, at 1360 (describing how tight interconnectedness of 
nonbank financial institutions such as Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG 
contributed to 2008 financial crisis). For example, the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
threatened the rest of the investment banking industry because of the banks’ propensity to 
trade with each other and the degree to which investment banks’ capital was tied up in the 
same investments or derivatives transactions. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of 
Bailouts, 99 Geo. L.J. 435, 456–58 (2011) (describing collapse of Lehman Brothers as 
example of “counterplay contagion,” or domino effect, because it led to collapse of many 
other financial institutions that depended on Lehman Brothers’s line of credit). 
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because those investors have entrusted more of their wealth to an indi-
vidual firm and so have stronger incentives to monitor.68 They do not 
and cannot count on a liquid market to protect them from agency costs 
and so must actively monitor management themselves. Investors in small 
private firms also require that the managers of those firms have more 
personal wealth at stake in the business’s success. Many prefer the free-
dom managers have when they do not have to contend with the judg-
ments of the “public” or pesky litigation spawned by zealous plaintiffs’ 
attorneys. Because private companies are not bound to public disclosure 
requirements, and the increased risk of litigation that comes with them, 
they may be able to attract better managers at lower cost. 
Investors in these smaller firms are aware that they are not protected 
by public reporting requirements or the public markets. Indeed, a firm 
may only opt out of those requirements if there are relatively few inves-
tors and/or those investors are particularly sophisticated.69 Private firms, 
in most instances, do not pose the same paternalism or externality con-
cerns as larger public firms do and so do not justify the application of a 
sticky default.70 As such, not only is it worthwhile for them to opt out, but 
it makes sense for the law to let them. It is this heterogeneity among 
business forms that makes the use of a default rule, rather than a manda-
tory one, sensible.71 Because businesses have different characteristics, and 
thus different needs, and interact with the market differently, “one size 
fits all” regulation is not appropriate. 
C. Sticky Default as Threat to Diversity 
Elements of the new JOBS Act may have the harmful effect of fun-
neling firms that do not pose paternalism or externality risks into the 
public reporting regime. It aims to draw more companies into public 
company status through an on-ramp for relatively small firms. It does so 
by creating emerging growth companies, companies with less than $1 
                                                                                                                 
68. See infra Part III.B (comparing unincorporated firms with those that have 
incorporated). 
69. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–230.506; see 1 Thomas Lee Hazen, Treatise on the Law of 
Securities Regulation § 4.20 (6th ed. 2009) (noting “accredited investors” are not counted 
toward purchaser minimums in SEC Rules 505 and 506); see also id. § 4.25 (describing 
exemption in Rule 506 for offer and sale of securities to less than thirty-five purchasers). 
70. See Ayres, supra note 42, at 2084, 2088 (discussing justifications for restrictions 
on freedom of contract and lawmakers’ motivation for using sticky defaults rather than 
mandatory rules). 
71. See id. at 2088 (“[W]hy not simply prohibit contracting for these disfavored 
outcomes? The simple answer is heterogeneity. Contracting parties may experience 
heterogeneous private benefits from contracting around, they might produce 
heterogeneous amounts of externalities, or they might produce heterogeneous 
paternalistic concerns.”). 
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billion in total annual gross revenues,72 and allowing those companies to 
offer securities to the public while also enjoying exemptions from several 
reporting requirements.73 For example, among other differences, EGCs 
are able to make a public offering of securities with only two years’ worth 
of audited financial statements and financial data, whereas companies 
that do not qualify for the EGC exemptions must provide three years of 
statements and five years of data.74 EGCs are also subject to less stringent 
accounting and disclosure standards than other public companies.75 The 
EGC can enjoy this quasi-public status until it either has annual gross 
revenues of $1 billion or more, reaches the fifth anniversary of when it 
issued securities pursuant to an effective registration statement, has is-
sued more than $1 billion in convertible debt, or is considered a “large 
accelerated filer.”76 The new grace period for EGCs gives a new public 
company time to adjust to reporting requirements and to enjoy a period 
of relief from some of the substantial costs associated with public com-
pany status.  
The EGC provisions of the JOBS Act provide small companies an in-
ducement to issue shares to the public even if they are not ready to real-
ize the full costs of public status, and hence may encourage them to “go 
public” before they are ready to and even before it is necessary for them 
                                                                                                                 
72. Section 2(a)(19) of the Securities Act now defines an “emerging growth 
company” as  
an issuer that had total annual gross revenues of less than $1,000,000,000 (as 
such amount is indexed for inflation every 5 years by the Commission to reflect 
the change in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers published by 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, setting the threshold to the nearest 1,000,000) 
during its most recently completed fiscal year.  
15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(19) (2012). 
73. See, e.g., § 77e(d) (allowing EGCs to communicate with accredited investors 
prior to filing for registration); § 77g(a)(2)(A) (requiring only two years of audited 
financial statements for registration statement); § 77g(a)(2)(B) (exempting EGCs from 
disclosure and accounting standards in section 2(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002). 
74. Compare § 77g(a)(2)(A) (requiring only two years of audited financial 
statements and selected financial data for registration statement for initial public offering 
of EGC), with § 77g(a)(1) (requiring three years of financial statements for registration 
statements generally). 
75. § 77g(a)(2)(B) (“An emerging growth company . . . may not be required to 
comply with any new or revised financial accounting standard until such date that a 
company that is not an issuer . . . is required to comply with such new or revised 
accounting standard . . . .”). 
76. Id. § 77b(a)(19)(A)–(D). A “large accelerated filer” is defined as an issuer that 
has “an aggregate worldwide market value of the voting and non-voting common equity 
held by its non-affiliates of $700 million or more, as of the last business day of the issuer’s 
most recently completed second fiscal quarter,” and has been subject to the requirements 
of sections 13(a) (i.e., 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)) or 15(d) (i.e., 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d)) for at least a 
year; has filed at least one annual report in accordance with section 13(a) or 15(d); and 
cannot use the requirements for smaller reporting companies. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 
(2013). 
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to opt into the public company default. Emerging growth companies may 
want to access the public capital markets, but they are firms that may 
have remained private under the old rules. Once they go public, it is ex-
pensive to go private again and it may not be possible to raise the funds 
necessary to do so after a small firm has been publicly traded for five 
years.77 It can be difficult to shrink a firm that has been allowed to grow 
in assets and shareholders for years. Therefore, a firm that may have 
trouble complying with the full array of public reporting requirements 
will struggle both in trying to go dark78 and in staying public. 
While public company status is an increasingly sticky default, it 
should still only draw companies that pose externality or paternalism 
concerns. As the JOBS Act entices more companies to access the public 
markets at temporarily lower costs, there is a risk of pushing too many 
companies to adopt a set of rules that does not serve them efficiently. If it 
is sensible for some companies to adopt an intermediate level of report-
ing, then making that new status temporary seems less so. However, if 
after a trial period, the on-ramp level of reporting seems to be sufficient 
for companies of a certain size, then that intermediate level of “public-
ness” would add yet more diversity and allow companies to have access to 
capital at lower cost. The potential advantages of the on-ramp approach 
and other policy considerations relevant to legal diversification are dis-
cussed in Part VI. For now, it is only important to understand how mov-
ing all firms to the same regulatory regime can be harmful and inappro-
priate. 
The next Parts of this Essay argue that there are benefits to having a 
variety of different reporting forms and legal rules for different compa-
nies to choose from for the purpose of helping firms adapt to changing 
circumstances and protecting investors from the consequences of failed 
legal policies. Governance choices and decisions about which securities 
to issue matter and, if a variety of legal rules are available, parties will be 
able to choose the most efficient rules to govern their circumstances. 
This goal of diversity of legal rules should be honored as a separate and 
important priority. 
                                                                                                                 
77. This, of course, would require that the firm make an error in judgment in 
deciding whether to go public. Firms are notoriously overoptimistic, though, especially 
with regard to IPO decisions. For example, recent IPOs from Facebook, Zynga, and 
Groupon performed much worse than their firms anticipated. Evelyn M. Rusli, Facebook 
Crossed Its $38 IPO Price, Wall St. J.: Digits (July 31, 2013, 9:35 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com
/digits/2013/07/31/facebook-bounces-back-to-38-ipo-price/ (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review). It is not hard to imagine that a firm’s management would overestimate the 
firm’s expected gains upon entering the public markets. 
78. “Going dark” means intentionally opting out of the public reporting 
requirements by falling below the statutory shareholder and asset thresholds. See supra 
notes 55–56 and accompanying text (explaining concept of “going dark”). 
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III. DIVERSIFICATION AMONG LEGAL RULES GOVERNING BUSINESS FORMS 
Companies seeking capital investment have a rich variety of choices 
when deciding what legal rules will govern the terms of their relation-
ships with investors. Those organizing new companies make important 
choices about what business form to use. The choice subjects the issuer 
and its investors to different legal rules governing their relative rights 
and responsibilities. Issuers make the choices that determine the legal 
rules that apply to investment in their firm and investors are able to 
choose in which firms they invest. The market thereby imposes pressure 
on the issuer to sell securities worth buying and to find the mix of legal 
rules that allows the firm to function well while offering investors enough 
rights to protect their investment and hopes for return. This Part of the 
Essay will consider the merits of these various choices and how they differ 
from each other to create a diverse menu of business forms from which 
investors can build well-diversified portfolios. 
A. The Corporation 
With the widely dispersed, rationally apathetic investor in mind, the 
law governing corporations, particularly publicly traded corporations, 
offers regulations designed to ensure that directors and officers will not 
appropriate corporate funds to personal use and that they will be held 
accountable to further the interests of corporate wealth maximization.79 
Its design accommodates a wide separation of ownership and control.80 
Because shareholders hold the residual claim, they are considered the 
owners of the firm, but a ready market for shares means shareholders can 
exit the firm if they are unhappy with management. A board of directors, 
elected by shareholders, is charged with monitoring the senior officers 
who make day-to-day business decisions for the firm. Shareholders are 
thus responsible neither for daily business decisions nor for overseeing 
such decisions.81 By choosing and monitoring directors, shareholders are 
                                                                                                                 
79. The corporation is the business form of choice for large operating companies 
with widely dispersed shareholding. See Ribstein, Rise of the Uncorporation, supra note 3, 
at 65 (observing corporate structure helped firms grow larger during Industrial 
Revolution); Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for 
Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 387, 389 (2003) 
(arguing corporate structure was integral in development of modern industrial economy).  
80. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property 4 (1932) (“The corporate system appears only when this type of private or 
‘close’ corporation has given way to an essentially different form, the quasi-public 
corporation: a corporation in which a large measure of separation of ownership and 
control has taken place through the multiplication of owners.”). 
81. Shareholders do have the power to vote to approve (or disapprove) certain major 
corporate actions such as the issuance of new stock or a merger. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. 
tit. 8, § 251(c) (2011); Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 407, 416–20 (2006) (discussing limited control rights of shareholders). 
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supposed to be able to protect their investment from managerial incom-
petence and disloyalty, while the ability to exit provides them a quick way 
to avoid the costs of corporate failure.  
The most significant governance advantage corporate law claims 
over partnerships is the mandatory fiduciary relationship between corpo-
rate directors and the firm.82 Corporate directors are said to owe fiduci-
ary duties of loyalty and care to the corporation and have an obligation 
to act in good faith in all corporate matters.83 The duty of loyalty, in its 
most basic form, prohibits conflicts of interest between directors and the 
corporation.84 Any potential conflicts must be disclosed and approved by 
a disinterested majority of shareholders or directors if the conflicted di-
rector is to avoid liability.85 Fiduciary duties are supposed to fill the gap 
in the corporate contract left by placing broad discretion in the hands of 
directors who are not carefully monitored by shareholders. The corpora-
tion relies on these amorphous duties, then, or some understanding of 
what they should be, to discipline managers in place of direct monitoring 
by owners. 
The corporate form encourages investment by rationally apathetic 
shareholders and offers protections from the risks of their apathy. Be-
cause ownership is designed to be so widely dispersed, shareholders can 
easily diversify their investments among a number of corporations and 
rely on the protections provided by that diversification and a liquid mar-
ket rather than having to invest in closely monitoring management. 
While investment in the stock of corporations can be profitable, many 
investors diversify further by participating in noncorporate opportunities. 
They find it worthwhile to invest funds in enterprises with fewer owners 
to realize the advantages of the flexibility provided by the governance 
structures of other business forms. 
                                                                                                                 
82. See Ribstein, Rise of the Uncorporation, supra note 3, at 68–69 (discussing 
differences between fiduciary duties of corporate directors and managing partners). 
83. E.g., 2 Jonathan R. Macey, Macey on Corporation Laws 16-136 to -141 (2013-3 
Supp. 2013) (discussing varying standards courts have applied to duties of loyalty, care, 
and obligation of good faith). 
84. E.g., Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle E. Corp., 545 A.2d 1171, 1174 
(Del. 1988) (“It is a basic principle of Delaware General Corporation Law that directors 
are subject to the fundamental fiduciary duties of loyalty and disinterestedness. 
Specifically, directors cannot stand on both sides of the transaction nor derive any 
personal benefit through self-dealing.”); see also Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing Fiduciary 
Duties, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 899, 901–03 (2011) (narrowly defining fiduciary duties to include 
only the duty to refrain from self-dealing). 
85. Tit. 8, § 144(a) (discussing disinterested requirement). The disinterested 
requirement has been read in by courts. See, e.g., Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 222 
(Del. 1976) (rejecting argument against reading disinterested requirement into § 144(a)). 
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B. Uncorporations 
“Uncorporations”86 are unincorporated firms such as general 
partnerships, LLCs, and limited partnerships (LPs).87 The general 
partnership is the most basic business form. General partnerships impose 
unlimited liability upon the partners who own the firm, meaning part-
ners are personally liable for the debts of the partnership.88 General part-
ners actively participate in management and control of the firm and are 
able to take their proportionate share of the value of the firm’s assets 
with them upon exit from the firm.89 Partnership capital is not “locked 
in” to the firm as corporate assets are.90 The abilities to directly manage 
the firm and to directly claim a proportionate share of firm profits and 
assets are fundamental benefits of the partnership form over the corpo-
rate form. Further, partnerships enjoy “flow-through” taxation, which 
means that partnership profits are taxed only once, as individual income 
for each partner.91 Corporate profits, on the other hand, are taxed 
twice—once at the corporate level and again, individually, when gains are 
                                                                                                                 
86. Larry Ribstein coined this term to describe unincorporated firms including 
general and limited partnerships, limited liability companies, and other variations on 
those entities. Ribstein, Rise of the Uncorporation, supra note 3, at 1. 
87. Larry E. Ribstein, The Uncorporation’s Domain, 55 Vill. L. Rev. 125, 125 (2010) 
[hereinafter Ribstein, Uncorporation’s Domain]. 
88. See Larry E. Ribstein, Statutory Forms for Closely Held Firms: Theories and 
Evidence from LLCs, 73 Wash. U. L.Q. 369, 379 (1995) [hereinafter Ribstein, Statutory 
Forms] (noting general partners have “agreed to be personally liable for the firm’s 
debts”); see also J. William Callison & Maureen A. Sullivan, Partnership Law and Practice: 
General and Limited Partnerships § 23:20 (2012) (“‘Except as provided in this [Act], a 
general partner of a limited partnership has the liabilities of a partner in a partnership 
without limited partners to persons other than the partnership and the other partners.’” 
(quoting Revised Unif. Ltd. P’ship Act (RULPA) § 403(b) (1985))). 
89. Unif. P’ship Act § 602(a) (1997) (“A partner has the power to dissociate at any 
time, rightfully or wrongfully, by express will pursuant to Section 601(1).”); id. § 807(b) 
(“Each partner is entitled to a settlement of all partnership accounts upon winding up the 
partnership business. In settling accounts among the partners, profits and losses that result 
from the liquidation of the partnership assets must be credited and charged to the 
partners’ accounts.”); Ribstein, Uncorporation’s Domain, supra note 87, at 125. 
90. See Margaret M. Blair, Reforming Corporate Governance: What History Can 
Teach Us, 1 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 1, 23–24 (2004) (discussing limited capital lock in of 
Limited Liability Partnerships (LLPs) and Limited Liability Limited Partnerships 
(LLLPs)); Ribstein, Uncorporation’s Domain, supra note 87, at 125 (distinguishing 
corporations from uncorporations on basis of capital lock-in). 
91. Ribstein, Statutory Forms, supra note 88, at 384 (“[F]irms that adopt statutory 
partnership features are taxed as partnerships on a flow-through basis rather than as 
separate entities like corporations.”); Victor E. Fleischer, Note, “If It Looks Like a Duck”: 
Corporate Resemblance and Check-the-Box Elective Tax Classification, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 
518, 522–23 (1996) [hereinafter Fleischer, Corporate Resemblance] (“Flow-through 
entities, on the other hand, do not pay tax at the entity level: income earned by the entity 
flows through to the partners or members and is taxed only at the individual level.”). 
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distributed to shareholders.92 Pass-through taxation is a significant ad-
vantage to choosing uncorporate business forms.93 
The most widely used uncorporate business forms combine the tax 
advantages of the partnership form with the limited liability of corpora-
tions. These “hybrid” business forms include limited liability companies 
and limited partnerships and contemplate active management or moni-
toring by owners.94 Because these uncorporations typically have a rela-
tively small number of owners, those owners can participate more di-
rectly in the management of the firm. They have strong incentives to 
watch their investment closely because they have not spread the risk of 
loss so widely. The relatively small number of owners also makes it easier 
for those owners to communicate with each other and coordinate plans 
for the business.95 
An uncorporation does not have to be managed by all or any of its 
owners, however. Uncorporations can designate managing owners to 
take primary responsibility for making business decisions.96 For example, 
in an LP, a general partner is responsible for making business decisions 
while the limited partners are passive investors who do not control the 
day-to-day business of the firm.97 LLCs may be member-managed or man-
ager-managed and frequently hire nonowner managers to operate the 
firm.98 This makes larger LPs and LLCs possible.99 As ownership of the 
                                                                                                                 
92.  Ribstein, Statutory Forms, supra note 88, at 404; Fleischer, Corporate 
Resemblance, supra note 91, at 522–23. 
93. Mohsen Manesh, Contractual Freedom Under Delaware Alternative Entity Law: 
Evidence from Publicly Traded LPs and LLCs, 37 J. Corp. L. 555, 573 (2012) (“Firms 
utilizing the alternative entity form, over the corporate form, do so chiefly because of the 
favorable ‘pass-through’ partnership tax treatment that is afforded to alternative 
entities.”); Ribstein, Uncorporation’s Domain, supra note 87, at 131 (“[T]he double 
corporate tax . . . motivated firms to seek . . . single-level partnership taxation . . . . The 
ultimate result was new uncorporate business . . . .”). 
94. See Ribstein, Uncorporation’s Domain, supra note 87, at 131–33 (discussing 
emergence and popularity of limited liability firms); see also Larry E. Ribstein, The 
Evolving Partnership, 26 J. Corp. L. 819, 823–24 (2001) [hereinafter Ribstein, Evolving 
Partnership] (stating LLCs have many partnership characteristics while also having certain 
corporate features). 
95. See Ribstein, Uncorporation’s Domain, supra note 87, at 128 (noting contracting 
costs are lower and private ordering is easier in closely held firms, as opposed to firms with 
many owners); see also Robert W. Hillman, The Bargain in the Firm: Partnership Law, 
Corporate Law, and Private Ordering Within Closely-Held Business Associations, 2005 U. 
Ill. L. Rev. 171, 179 (describing partnership as firm with small number of owners, which 
allows owners to interact with each other to manage firm). 
96. Michael J. Garrison & Terry W. Knoepfle, Limited Liability Company Interests as 
Securities: A Proposed Framework for Analysis, 33 Am. Bus. L.J. 577, 582 (1996). 
97. See id. at 585–86 (“[G]eneral partnerships are managed directly by the 
partners. . . . [L]imited partners usually do not participate in the running of the limited 
partnership.”); Ribstein, Evolving Partnership, supra note 94, at 842–43 (describing 
functions of general and limited partners). 
98. Garrison & Knoepfle, supra note 96, at 581–83. 
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firm becomes more widely dispersed, agency costs increase and the gov-
ernance mechanisms designed to constrain those costs become im-
portant. 
Direct monitoring is just one way uncorporations limit the agency 
costs of management. Uncorporations also use incentive compensation 
by giving managers ownership stakes that align their incentives with those 
of the residual claimants.100 Even nonowner managers are paid in a way 
that depends on the returns those managers generate on the investments 
of others. A significant portion of the pay uncorporate managers earn is 
a function of the profits that their efforts realize for the firm’s owners.101 
For example, hedge fund managers, the managers of another kind of 
uncorporate firm, are often paid 2% of the value of the assets under 
management and 20% of the returns those assets generate under man-
agement.102  
In contrast to corporations, uncorporations do not rely heavily on 
fiduciary obligations.103 The rights and obligations of owners and manag-
ers are fixed by agreement, and courts and organizing statutes allow the 
parties great flexibility in designing the terms of their relationship.104 
                                                                                                                 
99. See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Uncorporating the Large Firm (Univ. of Ill. Coll. 
of Law, Ill. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. LE08-016, 2008) [hereinafter Ribstein, 
Uncorporating the Large Firm], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1003790 (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review) (examining uncorporate governance structures of large 
firms). 
100. See Ribstein, Uncorporation’s Domain, supra note 87, at 126–27 (discussing 
incentives for managers who are given ownership stakes). 
101. See Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital 
Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 880 
(2003) (discussing manager compensation in venture capital (VC) startups); Sandra K. 
Miller, The Duty of Care in the LLC: Maintaining Accountability While Minimizing 
Judicial Interference, 87 Neb. L. Rev. 125, 181 (2008) (noting some LLC managers’ 
compensation is tied in part to performance); Ribstein, Uncorporation’s Domain, supra 
note 87, at 126–27 (explaining incentives and penalties for poor performance by 
managers); Houman B. Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds: Financial 
Innovation and Investor Protection, 6 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 240, 262 (2009) (noting hedge 
fund manager compensation is largely performance based). 
102. See Mercer Bullard, Regulating Hedge Fund Managers: The Investment 
Company Act as a Regulatory Screen, 13 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 286, 288 (2008) (“For 
example, hedge fund managers often receive the right to twenty percent of the investment 
performance of a fund that exceeds a minimum performance floor, or ‘hurdle rate.’”); 
Ribstein, Uncorporating the Large Firm, supra note 99, at 22 (“Fund partners earn an 
average two percent fee based on assets managed and twenty percent of the fund’s profits, 
or ‘carry,’ over a threshold amount.”). 
103. Ribstein, Rise of the Uncorporation, supra note 3, at 219–22 (explaining 
uncorporations rely on other governance devices to minimize agency costs). 
104. See Saul Levmore, Uncorporations and the Delaware Strategy, 2005 U. Ill. L. 
Rev. 195, 205–07 (noting partnership law is more flexible than corporate law); Larry E. 
Ribstein, The Uncorporation and Corporate Indeterminacy, 2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. 131, 142–
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Owners and managers may define their fiduciary obligations by contract 
or may even waive them entirely.105 This stands in stark contrast to the 
mandatory fiduciary duties in the governance structure of the corpora-
tion.106 Uncorporate firms do not have to rely on fiduciary duties because 
they have more direct, reliable monitoring methods to use. Uncorporate 
owners can negotiate directly, and renegotiate if necessary, about the 
obligations managers will owe, how owners will monitor and discipline 
management, and how owners will be able to exercise their power over 
the firm’s assets.107  
C. Diversifying Among Corporations and Uncorporations 
The governance structures of uncorporations and corporations are 
very different. Uncorporations rely on contracts, owner control, incentive 
compensation, and direct monitoring by owners while the corporate 
form relies heavily on fiduciary obligation to constrain the agency costs 
imposed by professional managers on widely dispersed, rationally apa-
thetic shareholders. Publicly traded corporations must adhere to strict 
requirements for the board of directors, set by federal law and securities 
exchanges, and must engage in detailed, periodic, public reporting of 
important information about the firm.108 Uncorporations, on the other 
hand, are able to take advantage of smaller, relatively attentive groups of 
equity holders to monitor and discipline managers who are much more 
likely to hold a significant equity stake in the firm themselves, or to be 
paid almost entirely with compensation that gives them strong incentives 
to maximize the value of the residual claim.109 Clearly delineated exit 
                                                                                                                 
43 (observing greater flexibility in uncorporations for establishing fiduciary duties 
through customized agreements). 
105. Callison & Sullivan, supra note 88, § 12:12 (“[C]ase law makes it clear that 
fiduciary obligations among partners . . . may be altered by agreement if the alteration is 
specifically contemplated by the partners.”); Ribstein, Rise of the Uncorporation, supra 
note 3, at 171–78 (detailing availability of opt-outs of fiduciary duties in various business 
organizations); Celia R. Taylor, Berle and Social Businesses: A Consideration, 34 Seattle U. 
L. Rev. 1501, 1509–10 (2011) (explaining, subject to limited statutory constraints, 
“uncorporations can contractually limit or eliminate fiduciary duties”). 
106. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1549, 1553 (1989) (“[M]any features of corporate law, great and small, are 
mandatory.”); Ribstein, Uncorporation’s Domain, supra note 87, at 127 (“[C]orporate 
statutes are generally phrased in mandatory terms with specific exceptions where the 
agreement controls . . . .”). 
107. Ribstein, Rise of the Uncorporation, supra note 3, at 8, 153, 171–78. 
108. See id. at 186–89, 199–203 (detailing history of corporations’ disclosure 
regulations and restrictions on board of directors); see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, 
and 29 U.S.C.); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78kk (2012). 
109. Ribstein, Rise of the Uncorporation, supra note 3, at 208 (“Consistent with the 
general uncorporate strategy of tying discipline to markets, partners have both upside 
opportunity and downside risk.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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rights substitute for the liquid markets available to investors in public 
firms by giving equity holders access to the firm’s capital.110 The variety 
provides different ways to address agency costs and allows each firm to 
select the governance form that best suits its needs. 
These different legal regimes suit different kinds of businesses at dif-
ferent times. Young companies, for instance, are more likely to be orga-
nized as uncorporations with a small group of attentive founding owners 
who guard their investments through direct monitoring and control111 
and can choose not to worry about amorphous fiduciary duties, as they 
may want to pursue other business opportunities simultaneously.112 As a 
company grows and matures, those owners may want to spread the risk of 
loss more widely or may want to cash out their investment. That is when 
the firm’s owners may choose to incorporate to take the firm public.113 
Then, the corporate form may make more sense in order to attend to the 
needs of a widely dispersed group of owners.  
Further, different forms may suit different kinds of businesses. Pro-
fessional firms, such as law firms and accounting firms, are required by 
law to be partnerships and so have adopted the limited liability partner-
ship (LLP) to maintain the partnership business form with limited liabil-
ity.114 Investment firms may operate better as uncorporations because of 
the size of the investments made by owners and the direct incentives 
given to managers. An investment firm would not want to place primary 
responsibility for running the firm with independent directors, but 
would rather closely monitor professional investors who will manage the 
firm’s assets in order to realize the greatest possible gain. As noted above, 
                                                                                                                 
110. Id. at 5 (“This power to cash out of the firm is, in effect, a powerful control 
mechanism that augments the minority’s voting rights.”); Morley & Curtis, supra note 4, at 
88 (“When a shareholder redeems, the fund pays the underlying assets to the shareholder, 
the fund correspondingly declines in size, and the shares are extinguished.”). 
111. See generally Ribstein, Rise of the Uncorporation, supra note 3, at 226–28, 246 
(noting young firms are more likely to be VC firms and detailing structure of and rights in 
VC firms); Daniel S. Goldberg, Choice of Entity for a Venture Capital Start-Up: The Myth 
of Incorporation, 55 Tax Law. 923 (2002) (discussing advantages of partnership and LLC 
forms for startups). 
112. See Paul A. Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle 73–79 (2d ed. 
2004) (discussing types of covenants utilized by VC firms to protect firm from self-
dealing); Ribstein, Rise of the Uncorporation, supra note 3, at 5 (“In modern 
uncorporations, the owners’ limited liability lets them be passive, delegate control to 
managers, and hold their interests as part of a diversified portfolio of investments.”). 
113. Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, Does Private Equity Create Wealth? 
The Effects of Private Equity and Derivatives on Corporate Governance, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
219, 236 (2009) (noting risk sharing is one benefit of going public). 
114. See Robert W. Hillman, Organizational Choices of Professional Service Firms: 
An Empirical Study, 58 Bus. Law. 1387, 1387, 1394–95 (2003) (discussing popularity and 
protections of LLP model); Larry E. Ribstein, Partnership Governance of Large Firms, 76 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 289, 307 n.86 (2009) (“State law currently prohibits law firms from having 
nonlawyer owners.” (citing Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.4 (2008))). 
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those managers are then compensated according to the profits their ef-
forts generate.115  
An investor may want to take advantage of the gains riskier business 
enterprises realize, while maintaining greater exit rights and monitoring 
abilities, and then also seek comfort in larger, more established, less risky 
investments that do not need to be monitored as carefully. The ad-
vantages of the uncorporate form allow firms to engage in a different 
kind of management and allow them to take different kinds of business 
risk. The ability of owners of uncorporate firms to opt out of fiduciary 
duties means that those firms can attract entrepreneurs who may have 
some potentially conflicting business interests but who may also bring a 
talent for the business and valuable connections to the firm. The flexible, 
contract-based nature of uncorporate firms also means that they are able 
to experiment with different governance forms and different contracts 
among owners and between owners and managers. Those experiments 
may reveal governance structures that maximize profitability in new and 
different ways.  
Investors should participate in these experiments. They should sam-
ple among them to take advantage, at least to a small extent, of innova-
tions in business operations and in limiting the agency costs of manage-
ment. New and flexible business forms allow experimentation with gov-
ernance that may uncover better ways to maximize profit while limiting 
agency costs. Through legal diversification, investors can participate in 
that experimentation while also investing in better-established, well-
known governance forms. 
While all Delaware public corporations will not collapse at the same 
time because of the governance rules to which they are subject, a system-
atic failure of that governance regime could cause Delaware public cor-
porations, on average, to experience more governance problems, and 
thus higher agency costs, than other kinds of firms. For example, a signif-
icant decision by the Delaware Supreme Court refusing to impose liabil-
ity against managers for a certain kind of troubling behavior could in-
crease the risk that shareholders will suffer an injury at the hands of 
managers of Delaware corporations. Or, a well-intentioned governance 
policy, such as options compensation, could have unintended conse-
quences leading a large number of managers subject to that kind of 
compensation to systematically cause the firms they manage to take ill-
advised risks. Given that risk exists, particularly when governance is far 
from perfect and the system has yet to find ways to completely eradicate 
the agency costs of firm governance, an investor is well advised to invest 
in a number of kinds of firms and of securities in order to profit from the 
advantages each set of legal rules provides investors. 
                                                                                                                 
115. See supra notes 100–102 and accompanying text (discussing how managers of 
uncorporations are compensated based on firm’s profits). 
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Business form is not the only way to diversify among legal regimes 
governing investment. An investor may also diversify by legal regime gov-
erning particular securities. Even within a single firm, an investor may 
buy securities governed by different legal rules. The next Part examines 
the different rules governing securities and considers how an investor 
may diversify among them.  
IV. LEGAL RULES GOVERNING SECURITIES  
Regardless of the business form chosen, a firm must raise capital by 
issuing securities or borrowing money. If the firm issues debt or equity 
securities, it must decide whether those securities will be publicly or pri-
vately held, thereby deciding what legal rules will govern the relationship 
between the issuing firm and the investors who purchase the securities. 
Investors may decide to hold different kinds of securities governed by 
different legal rules not only because they represent different kinds of 
capital investments, but also because of the different legal protections 
provided for each kind of security. For instance, holding private equity 
may allow an investor to capture a larger proportionate share of the gains 
generated by a particular company and to avoid the costs the company 
would incur in honoring public disclosure obligations, but that investor 
would miss out on the advantages of the liquid trading markets accom-
panying public equity.116 Public debt may have advantages in that it is less 
risky than public equity in many instances, and bondholders are repre-
sented by indenture trustees who can help them overcome the collective 
action problem affecting widely dispersed groups of investors, but the 
lower risk associated with bonds may mean lower returns, and bondhold-
ers do not benefit from corporate fiduciary duties or shareholders’ vot-
ing rights.117 Holding a diverse set of different kinds of securities may 
help an investor diversify risk, but it will also allow investors to hold secu-
rities with fundamental characteristics that differ, not only in where they 
fall in a capital structure, but also with regard to the rights investors have 
against the firm and the protections from agency costs. This Part demon-
                                                                                                                 
116. See Steven E. Hurdle, Jr., Comment, A Blow to Public Investing: Reforming the 
System of Private Equity Fund Disclosures, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 239, 245–48 (2005) 
(explaining holding private equity can enable investor to meet exemptions under 
Securities Act of 1933 and Investment Company Act of 1940); see also 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77d(a)(2) (2012) (exempting from reporting requirements transactions that do not 
include public offering); id. § 80a-3(c)(1) (exempting private equity firms from disclosure 
and reporting requirements). 
117. Yakov Amihud, Kenneth Garbade & Marcel Kahan, A New Governance 
Structure for Corporate Bonds, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 447, 469–70 (1999) (suggesting new 
governance structure to overcome current collective action problems); Steven L. Schwarcz 
& Gregory M. Sergi, Bond Defaults and the Dilemma of the Indenture Trustee, 59 Ala. L. 
Rev. 1037, 1037–38 (2008) (discussing role of indenture trustee in mitigating collective 
action problems amongst bondholders). 
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strates how an investor can diversify among different kinds of securities 
by considering the important legal protections each kind of security of-
fers and showing how those legal features can be profitable in different 
circumstances. An investor legally diversifies in important ways when she 
invests in securities governed by different legal rules because she is buy-
ing different legal protections against risks of loss and is buying different 
legal rights to the assets of the firms. 
A. Public Equity 
A firm issuing equity securities must register those securities with the 
SEC before offering them to the public unless it can show that the issu-
ance is a private placement or fits into another exception to the registra-
tion requirement.118 Under the Securities Exchange Act, an issuer with at 
least 2,000 shareholders, no more than 499 of whom are unaccredited 
investors, and more than $10 million in assets must enter the periodic 
disclosure system and make annual and quarterly disclosures to the mar-
ket.119 The securities laws apply in full force to companies with publicly 
traded equity and are designed to offer significant protections to inves-
tors in the capital markets. 
Investors derive many benefits from the disclosure requirements. 
Most significantly, the federal securities laws require public companies to 
disclose material information to the market to allow investors to reliably 
value companies’ securities, facilitating informed decisions about 
whether to buy or sell those securities and what prices to use.120 Regular 
disclosures from the company allow shareholders, or their representa-
tives, to monitor management and can help shareholders decide when 
changes should be made to the firm’s executive team.121 Sophisticated 
stock analysts can follow publicly traded companies, inform investors of 
the condition of those companies, and give advice about how to trade in 
the company’s securities. Because the disclosures are public and analysts 
and institutional shareholders pay attention to them, the information 
                                                                                                                 
118. Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 requires all nonexempt offerings to be 
registered. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c). 
119. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 12(g), 13(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l(g), 
78m(a)(2). 
120. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Carving a New Path to Equity Capital and Share 
Liquidity, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 639, 643–45 (2009) (describing various disclosure laws intended 
to protect investors through public availability of information); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–
77z-3 (regulating creation, use, and registration of securities); id. §§ 78a–78mm (setting 
out extensive regulation of securities exchanges). 
121. Sjostrom, supra note 120, at 643–45 (describing disclosures required annually, 
quarterly, and as needed). 
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disclosed will be incorporated into stock prices even if lay investors never 
hear of them.122  
Given the protections securities regulations provide, the public cor-
poration can be a particularly safe option for rationally apathetic inves-
tors. They have the protections of state corporation law, which give them 
an independent board to oversee managers on their behalf, and they 
have teams of sophisticated professionals monitoring those firms through 
the public disclosures those companies are required to make. A rationally 
apathetic investor could assure diversification and then let her invest-
ments virtually take care of themselves. The market liquidity provided by 
active markets in publicly traded stock allows investors to more easily di-
versify their stock holdings and to exit firms when a particular security is 
underperforming.123 This liquidity also helps the market value securities 
in a reasonably reliable way so that investors feel confident trading in 
stock at given prices. The antifraud regulations enforcing the accuracy of 
required disclosures support the prices the market sets for publicly 
traded stock.124 
The regulations governing the issuance of public equity and compli-
ance with the mandatory reporting system impose significant costs on 
issuers, costs that prevent many issuers from opting into the public com-
pany regulatory regime. There are, therefore, great, profitable compa-
nies that remain private. Indeed, many firms find that the advantages of 
remaining private allow them to exploit different business opportunities 
or to operate more profitably than they could if they were forced to 
comply with public company regulation.125 The gains available through 
investment in private equity may entice investors away from the highly 
regulated public market, providing another avenue for diversification. 
                                                                                                                 
122. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46 J. Fin. 1575, 1575 (1991) 
(defining market efficiency hypothesis as statement that security prices fully reflect all 
available information); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988) 
(“‘[C]ompeting judgments of buyers and sellers as to the fair price of a security brings [sic] 
about a situation where the market price reflects as nearly as possible a just price.’” 
(alteration in Basic Inc.) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 73-1383, at 11 (1934))). 
123. All stocks are essentially fungible. See Claudio Loderer et al., The Price Elasticity 
of Demand for Common Stock, 46 J. Fin. 621, 621 (1991) (“A common assumption in 
finance theory is that individual assets have perfect substitutes.”). But see Alicia Davis 
Evans, The Investor Compensation Fund, 33 J. Corp. L. 223, 263 n.204 (2007) 
(questioning Loderer’s statement that all stocks have perfect substitutes). 
124. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 246–47 (finding market price of shares reflects all publicly 
available information, and thus, any material misrepresentations). 
125. See infra notes 151–154 and accompanying text (discussing Dell’s buyout and its 
ramifications). 
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B. Private Equity 
Because issuing public securities is expensive, both initially and for 
the duration of the issuance, companies often try to avoid public com-
pany status by keeping their ownership shares privately traded. Staying 
private can take some careful planning and often requires turning to so-
phisticated investors in order to raise substantial capital. A firm may or-
ganize its equity issuance so that it fits within an exception to the registra-
tion requirements of the Securities Act.126 In doing so, firms focus on 
finding sophisticated, or “accredited,” investors to invest in the com-
pany’s equity.127 These accredited investors can be institutional investors 
who are representing large numbers of retail, or unaccredited, investors 
such as pension or retirement funds.128 They can also be wealthy individ-
ual investors who are investing a relatively small portion of their wealth in 
the firm.129 In a private placement, less sophisticated investors may 
participate, but they must be close to the issuer and have access to de-
tailed information about the issuer to facilitate careful monitoring of the 
firm.130 When trying to stay private after issuing stock as a private com-
pany, firms focus on keeping the number of equity holders in the firm 
                                                                                                                 
126. Regulation D contains exemptions from the section 5 registration requirements. 
17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2013). Rule 504 provides an exemption for the offer and sale of up to 
$1 million of securities in a twelve-month period. § 230.504. General offerings and 
solicitations are permitted under Rule 504 as long as they are restricted to accredited 
investors. Id. Rule 505 provides an exemption for offers and sales of securities totaling up 
to $5 million in any twelve-month period. § 230.505. The issued securities are restricted, in 
that the investors may not sell them for at least two years without registering the 
transaction. Id. General solicitation or advertising to sell the securities is not allowed. 
§ 230.502(c). 
127. The federal securities laws define the term “accredited investor” to include 
investment banks, pension funds, retirement funds, insiders of the issuer, and individuals 
with net worth exceeding $1 million. § 230.501(a). 
128. See 1 Stuart R. Cohn, Securities Counseling for Small and Emerging Companies 
§ 6:17, at 260 (2012) (providing examples of institutional investors under 17 C.F.R. § 
230.501(a)(1)); Roberta S. Karmel, Regulation by Exemption: The Changing Definition of 
an Accredited Investor, 39 Rutgers L.J. 681, 684 (2008) (noting problems with “accredited 
investor” definition and resulting changes); So-Yeon Lee, Note, Why the “Accredited 
Investor” Standard Fails the Average Investor, 31 Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 987, 1007 (2012) 
(explaining institutional investors currently dominate market); Greg Oguss, Note, Should 
Size or Wealth Equal Sophistication in Federal Securities Laws?, 107 Nw. U. L. Rev. 285, 
295 (2012) (detailing which institutions are “qualified institutional buyers” under Rule 
144A). 
129. See Oguss, supra note 128, at 293–94 (stating wealthy individual investors also 
qualify under Securities Act’s “accredited investor” definition). 
130. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(h) (providing requirements of purchaser 
representative); Hazen, supra note 69, § 4.25, at 577 (noting nonaccredited investors 
“must have such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that the 
purchaser . . . is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment”). 
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below the public reporting thresholds,131 limiting the trading of their 
securities, and ensuring that their securities are held by accredited inves-
tors.132 
Scholars are beginning to pay more attention to online secondary 
markets in these privately traded securities.133 Elizabeth Pollman points 
out that the presence of a liquid market without the protections provided 
in the public markets leads to the same problems one would expect from 
an active, unregulated market in securities—asymmetric information and 
insider trading.134 But the ease and lower costs associated with being able 
to avoid public reporting and registration status by trading on private 
markets instead enable smaller firms to raise capital and provide liquidity 
to their investors on a scale they could not achieve if they were forced to 
go public as a consequence.135 
It might seem unfair that only sophisticated, accredited investors are 
able to invest in private equity, and so enjoy the significant profits those 
firms can generate.136 To the contrary, not only can most individuals 
participate in private offerings and private equity through the sophisti-
cated institutional investors that manage their investments (often 
through managed retirement accounts),137 but “unsophisticated” 
                                                                                                                 
131. Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act exempts firms not trading on a 
national exchange that have less than $10 million in assets held by fewer than 2,000 
persons or 500 unaccredited investors. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l(g), 78m(f) (2012). 
132. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (defining “accredited investor”); Jasmin Sethi, 
Another Role for Securities Regulation: Expanding Investor Opportunity, 16 Fordham J. 
Corp. & Fin. L. 783, 800 (2011) (discussing accredited investor requirement for hedge 
fund investment); Hurdle, supra note 116, at 246 (noting Regulation D safe harbor rule 
letting firm “enter into a partnership with an unlimited number of ‘accredited investors’ 
and up to thirty-five additional investors who are ‘sophisticated’” (footnote omitted)). 
133. See, e.g., Langevoort & Thompson, “Publicness,” supra note 61, at 349–50 
(discussing emergence of secondary markets for trading private securities); Elizabeth 
Pollman, Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 179, 180 (2012) (same); 
see also Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 15 
(2012) (explaining possibility of emergence of secondary markets as “potential game 
changer in venture capital”). 
134. Pollman, supra note 133, at 207, 216 (noting lack of information present in 
private secondary markets can result in information asymmetry and insider trading). 
135. Id. at 203–05, 235 (explaining secondary markets enabling companies to remain 
private can increase liquidity in private company stock, which in turn assists private 
companies in raising capital). 
136. See Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law’s Dirty Little Secret, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 
3389, 3390–91 (2013) (“The dirty little secret of U.S. securities law is that the rich not only 
have more money—they also have access to types of wealth-generating investments not 
available, by law, to the average investor.”); Lee, supra note 128, at 987 (“Surprisingly, U.S. 
securities regulations award special investment privileges to the already affluent, resulting 
in a legal system that makes it even easier for them to amass wealth.”).  
137. See Langevoort, supra note 4, at 1030 (“Increasingly . . . retail investment 
decisions relate to investing in a mutual fund or insurance product, making retirement 
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individuals are also predominantly the owners of small, local businesses 
that never go public. Even in larger private firms, employees make up a 
significant share of the owners.138 Investors are trusted to fend for them-
selves in these investments because of their close knowledge of the issuer 
and their particularly strong ability to monitor the firm and its manage-
ment. Retail investors can also seek the profits of private firms by invest-
ing in public holding corporations that invest in privately traded stock.139 
Berkshire Hathaway is an example of the public holding company model, 
but newer firms are springing up with the specific goal of investing in 
smaller, younger private firms.140 Granted, many unsophisticated inves-
tors are not engaging in the secondary market trades in private equity, 
nor are they investing directly in private equity funds or hedge funds, but 
to say they have no access to those markets does not quite tell the whole 
story.  
Private equity plays important roles at different points in a com-
pany’s life cycle. Many firms begin with venture capital support.141 Ven-
ture capital firms that supply initial investment expect to exit the firm 
eventually, either by selling the firm to another (often publicly traded) 
                                                                                                                 
plan elections, or deferring to account management by a brokerage firm or investment 
adviser, rather than investing directly in issuers’ securities.”). 
138. See Pollman, supra note 133, at 194 n.82 (“Just prior to the date of this 
publication, SecondMarket released third quarter data indicating that companies are 
engaging in share buy-back programs and that an increasing percentage of sellers are 
current employees.”); see also The Q3 2012 SecondMarket Report, SecondMarket (Nov. 9, 
2012), https://www.secondmarket.com/education/reports/q3-2012-secondmarket-report 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (demonstrating companies are engaging in share 
buyback programs and increasing percentage of sellers are current employees). 
139. See Tomio Geron, With GSV Fund, the Little Guy Can Shoot for the Next 
Facebook, Forbes (May 16, 2011, 1:57 AM) [hereinafter Geron, Little Guy Can Shoot], http
://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2011/05/16/with-gsv-fund-the-little-guy-can-shoot-
for-the-next-facebook/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing how new 
“publicly-traded closed-end mutual fund” will allow unaccredited investors to invest in 
private companies). 
140. See Tomio Geron, GSV Capital Investment Values Facebook at $70 Billion, 
Forbes (June 27, 2011, 1:38 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2011/06/27/
gsv-capital-investment-values-facebook-at-70-billion/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(describing how “publicly-traded, closed-end mutual fund” will “give retail investors access 
to new high growth tech companies” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Geron, Little 
Guy Can Shoot, supra note 139 (describing how “new publicly-traded closed-end mutual 
fund” GSV was formed to allow “retail investors to invest in new growth companies”); 
Randall Smith, GSV Capital, Placing Bets on Start-Ups, Falters, N.Y. Times: Dealbook 
(Aug. 29, 2012, 8:35 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/29/gsv-capital-placing-
bets-on-start-ups-falters/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“GSV, short for Global 
Silicon Valley, is the largest of several closed-end mutual funds that offer ordinary 
investors a chance to own stakes in privately held companies, at least indirectly.”).  
141. See Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the 
American Experience, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1067, 1070–71 (2003) (providing overview of 
venture capital cycle); Pollman, supra note 133, at 184 (explaining venture capital cycle). 
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company or by taking the firm public on its own.142 The startup money is 
vitally important to the firm as it begins and grows, and the timing of exit 
is important to the venture capital firm.143 Investing in these firms at this 
early stage can be very lucrative.144 Of course, most investors will never be 
able to invest in a firm at this early stage, but the legal terms of the in-
vestment are still vitally important to its success. Pushing companies to go 
public too soon or forcing them all to be corporations would undermine 
essential characteristics of this important phase of development. 
Private equity funds that invest in publicly traded businesses to take 
those businesses private also play an important role at a different point in 
a firm’s life.145 For example, private equity firms often take public firms 
private when they are experiencing financial difficulty.146 The private eq-
uity firm reorganizes the troubled firm, often cutting costs and reorganiz-
ing its capital structure, before selling the firm to another company or 
offering its stock to the public again.147 This public-private-public cycle 
can serve as an alternative to bankruptcy and can reap significant, rela-
tively short-term148 profits for the private equity fund’s investors. Allowing 
investors to participate in these funds and allowing those firms to remain 
private enable investors to diversify in a different way. When firms file for 
bankruptcy protection, the equity position is usually minimal or nonex-
istent and shares are typically considered worthless. When a firm goes 
private to reorganize, those who can invest in the private firm are able to 
realize the profits from reorganization. Investing in private equity can be 
a way for investors of all kinds to hedge against the risk of financial fail-
ure and even to diversify away some risk of market- or industry-wide fi-
                                                                                                                 
142. See Victor Fleischer, The Missing Preferred Return, 31 J. Corp. L. 77, 83 (2005) 
(stating venture capital firm’s “ultimate goal is to take the portfolio companies public or 
sell the companies’ stocks or assets to another company”); see also Ibrahim, supra note 
133, at 11–15 (describing decreasing availability of traditional exits employed by venture 
capital firms); Pollman, supra note 133, at 184 (stating goal for venture capital “start-up” 
companies is to achieve successful exits). 
143. See Gompers & Lerner, supra note 112, at 168 (explaining why firms turn to 
venture capitalism over more traditional financing). 
144. Rodrigues, supra note 136, at 3397–401 (explaining angel investments and 
venture capital investments in “budding” company can be very profitable). 
145. See Jonathan R. Macey, Corporate Governance: Promises Kept, Promises 
Broken 246 (2008) (describing increasing importance of private equity investors in 
corporate governance in light of cost and difficulty involved in company going public). 
146. See id. at 241 (stating private equity firm will typically delist public company it 
invests in and hold it private in order to reorganize it). 
147. Id. (“During that period, the private equity firm works with management to 
reshape its strategy, restructure its organization, [and] strengthen its corporate 
governance . . . . [T]he private equity firm then ‘unlocks the value’ of the investment by 
selling the company in a public or private offering . . . .”). 
148. The time horizon to recoup these investments is generally three to five years, 
which is considered short-term. See id. at 249 (stating typical time frame for private equity 
investor is five years, and hedge funds attempt to recoup even quicker than five years). 
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nancial downturn. They can recoup lost profits through the profits gen-
erated for private equity through reorganization. 
Many are skeptical of the net societal benefits of private equity.149 
This Essay is not concerned with establishing whether these funds always 
do what is best for society or even whether they do more good than bad. 
There are certainly valid concerns about leveraged buyouts that would 
qualify as effective fraudulent conveyances and inappropriate payouts to 
managers.150 The point this Essay is making is that those funds can realize 
profits from reorganizing a firm and that it would be beneficial to diversi-
fication of investment portfolios to allow investors to participate in those 
profits. 
The private status of private equity funds is essential to the success of 
this reorganization process. Those who work so hard to reorganize trou-
bled firms would not have the incentives to do so if they had to share 
their profits with millions of public shareholders, nor would they want to 
incur the expense of complying with public disclosure requirements. For 
example, Dell recently announced that it was going private.151 The 
motivation for the move was to reorganize the troubled company and to 
do so, in part, by taking bold business risks that public shareholders 
might not tolerate.152 The firm could then attend to the difficult business 
of redefining its operations beyond the judgmental eye of the public cap-
                                                                                                                 
149. See, e.g., Michelle M. Harner, Corporate Control and the Need for Meaningful 
Board Accountability, 94 Minn. L. Rev. 541, 554–55 (2010) [hereinafter Harner, 
Corporate Control] (noting concerns regarding impact of private fund activism on long-
term corporate value); see also Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in 
Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1021, 1083–87 (2007) 
(describing “short-termism” concerns regarding private equity funds). 
150. See Harner, Corporate Control, supra note 149, at 558–59 (noting activism in 
private funds can lead to conflicts of interest and self-dealing behavior by stakeholders in 
times of corporate distress); see also Michelle M. Harner, Activist Distressed Debtholders: 
The New Barbarians at the Gate?, 89 Wash. U. L. Rev. 155, 167–68 (2011) (describing 
hazards of debt-to-equity play by private equity firms and noting recent cases in which 
fraudulent conveyance claims have emerged after leveraged buyouts). 
151. Michael J. de la Merced & Quentin Hardy, Dell Shares Rise on News Company 
May Go Private, N.Y. Times: Dealbook (Jan. 14, 2013, 2:20 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.
com/2013/01/14/dell-shares-surge-after-report-of-possible-buyout/?hpw (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (“Bloomberg News reported that the beleaguered personal 
computer [company] was in talks with at least two private equity firms over a potential 
buyout.”); see Ben Worthen & Anupreeta Das, Dell: From PC King to Buyout Fodder, Wall 
St. J. (Jan. 17, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324595704578244
174200133296.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (explaining “buyout group 
would include [a] private-equity firm”). 
152. See de la Merced & Hardy, supra note 151 (“While a buyout would not solve any 
of Dell’s problems, it would enable the company to take radical measures without the 
harsh glare of shareholders.”); see also Worthen & Das, supra note 151 (predicting buyout 
will allow Dell to act without regard to quarterly earnings). 
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ital markets.153 The reorganization may well be profitable, to the tune of 
a potential 20% return on investment.154 However, it is a risky and debt-
laden process, not a risk unsophisticated investors would be well advised 
to take on their own.  
The use of institutional investors as “accredited” or “sophisticated” 
investors allows the rationally apathetic retail investor to participate in 
these profits in some way, even though she would not be able to invest in 
these private firms directly.155 The accredited investor requirement aims 
to protect retail investors from the lower level of regulation to which pri-
vate equity is subject.156 This is one way in which the securities laws try to 
pinpoint when opting out of the public company default is less likely to 
impose externalities. The presence of sophisticated traders, whether or 
not they are representing unsophisticated traders, should help to protect 
investors without resort to mandatory disclosure. The sophisticated in-
termediary will stay informed about the firm and make necessary invest-
ment decisions. While the unsophisticated beneficial owners or benefi-
ciaries may be vulnerable to agency costs resulting from the delegation of 
investment authority to the institutional investor, they may also be better 
at monitoring the performance of their investment account or choosing 
among advisors than they are at carefully monitoring an operating com-
pany.157 The delegation may make sense, then, even in the face of addi-
tional agency costs, and the ability to diversify investment to yet another 
very active part of the market may more than make up for additional 
risks and the costs of forgoing the protections of public reporting re-
quirements.  
Although there are fewer protections for retail investors in private 
equity, and access to private equity is relatively limited, it is very im-
portant that investors be given access to this sector of the market for the 
benefits of diversification it provides. Usha Rodrigues’s suggestion to 
open the private markets to mutual funds may prove a promising avenue 
                                                                                                                 
153. See de la Merced & Hardy, supra note 151 (explaining Dell stock suffered while 
Dell tried to cut reliance on PC business); see also Worthen & Das, supra note 151 
(“Going private could allow Mr. Dell to continue reorienting the company around 
hardware, software and services for businesses, without having to worry about keeping up 
quarterly earnings during the process.”). 
154. Worthen & Das, supra note 151 (“Even if Dell’s free cash flow drops off, its 
private-equity investors could achieve returns of 20% on a deal . . . .”). 
155. See supra notes 127–132 and accompanying text (discussing “accredited” 
investors and how retail investors can invest in private firms through them).  
156. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2012) (outlining transactions exempted from restrictions 
and prohibitions on securities exchanges); Hazen, supra note 69, § 4.24 (describing 
private placement exemption).  
157. See D. Bruce Johnsen, Myths About Mutual Fund Fees: Economic Insights on 
Jones v. Harris, 35 J. Corp. L. 561, 605 (2010) (stating institutional clients are willing to 
directly monitor their managers, or hire sophisticated consultants to do so, in order to 
guarantee high quality management). 
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for legal diversification as well.158 Investment in private equity allows 
investors to realize benefits from investing in particular parts of a com-
pany’s life cycle, and it also allows investment in firms with goals and risk 
preferences that would be ill suited to the public markets. Investment in 
private equity could then fit nicely into a well-diversified portfolio for 
both investment and legal purposes. The freedom from legal regulation 
enjoyed by private equity firms allows them to take bigger risks and to 
attract large investments from sophisticated parties relatively quickly. 
This legal advantage correlates to higher returns in important ways. 
Thus, legal diversification is an important component of investment di-
versification. 
C. Public Debt 
The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 governs the issuance of public debt 
securities.159 An indenture trustee acts on behalf of the firm’s public 
bondholders,160 helping them overcome their collective action problem 
by representing their interests to management and enforcing the cove-
nants of the indenture.161 While the indenture trustee is relatively weak 
and inactive through most of the firm’s life, it can become particularly 
powerful if the issuing firm files for bankruptcy.162 Then, indenture trus-
tees often sit on the powerful Committee of Unsecured Creditors and 
can heavily influence the reorganization of the firm.163 The indenture 
trustee is one advantage bondholders have over similarly dispersed pub-
lic shareholders. The fixed claim and liquidation preference of debt are 
others.  
Again, it is not just the position in a firm’s capital structure or the 
relative risk profile of a security that can provide an advantage to inves-
tors in that security. The legal rights those investors have also provide 
                                                                                                                 
158. Rodrigues, supra note 136, at 3430–34 (suggesting possible solution to limited 
access of private investors to private equity is to alter regulations, specifically liquidity 
requirements, currently deterring mutual funds from investing in sector). 
159. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa–77bbbb. 
160. See id. § 77jjj(a)(4) (“In the case of certificates of interest or participation, the 
indenture trustee or trustees shall have the legal power to exercise all of the rights, 
powers, and privileges of a holder of the security or securities in which such certificates 
evidence an interest or participation.”). 
161. See Schwarcz & Sergi, supra note 117, at 1043–45 (describing various duties of 
indenture trustee and how Trust Indenture Act of 1939 enabled public bondholders to 
overcome collective action problem). 
162. See Efrat Lev, The Indenture Trustee: Does It Really Protect Bondholders?, 8 U. 
Miami Bus. L. Rev. 47, 108–11 (1999) (describing trustee’s many responsibilities in 
bankruptcy context). 
163. See id. at 110 (noting many trustees serve on creditors’ committees and trustee 
also has standing to seek changes in size and membership of committee or appoint 
additional committee); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (2012) (describing appointment of 
committees of creditors and role of such committees). 
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advantages that may suit the investor in different ways in different cir-
cumstances. The use of an indenture trustee to represent bondholders 
gives them the ability to directly monitor and negotiate with the firm’s 
managers in ways shareholders cannot.164 The indenture trustee enforces 
the covenants in the bond indenture, covenants that give bondholders 
the authority to limit corporate action in times of financial distress.165 
Thus, not only do bondholders have the advantage of the fixed claim 
and liquidation preference afforded debt, but they are also able to di-
rectly influence managers’ decisionmaking and corporate action when 
the firm is at or near insolvency. These particular advantages are con-
ferred by the legal rules that apply to bond indentures and the ways those 
indentures are enforced. Investing in the set of legal rules that governs 
bonds is another important way for investors to legally diversify. 
D. Derivatives 
Investors, unsophisticated and sophisticated alike, flock to deriva-
tives trading to hedge risk and to engage in speculation and arbitrage.166 
While some particularly complex derivatives are blamed in part for the 
systemic risk the economy faced in 2007 to 2008, trading in options has 
proven a successful way to hedge the risk of many investments.167 The 
derivatives market is the world’s largest market, but is still relatively 
lightly regulated.168 While derivatives are securities subject to antifraud 
regulation, they are privately traded and many are completely private, 
                                                                                                                 
164. Shareholders often free ride on the monitoring of management creditors. See 
Charles K. Whitehead, Creditors and Debt Governance, in Research Handbook on the 
Economics of Corporate Law 68, 75–76 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012) 
(“Trading among a small group of informed investors, however, can still result in the 
public release of a substantial amount of private information through competitive pricing. 
Others can rely on that information to make their own investment decisions . . . .”). 
165. See Schwarcz & Sergi, supra note 117, at 1045 (“The indenture trustee must 
notify bondholders of a payment default, but need not notify bondholders of lesser 
defaults if it determines in good faith that withholding such notice is in the interests of 
bondholders.”). 
166. See William A. Klein et al., Business Organization and Finance: Legal and 
Economic Principles 403 (11th ed. 2010) (describing widespread investment in 
derivatives). 
167. M. Todd Henderson, Credit Derivatives Are Not “Insurance,” 16 Conn. Ins. L.J. 
1, 23 (2009) (describing options as insurance hedging against risks for multiple parties). 
168. Klein et al., supra note 166, at 403; see id. at 455 (discussing proposed 
regulatory reforms of requiring some derivatives to be traded on centralized clearing 
houses and related regulation of credit rating agencies, “which played a prominent role in 
the creation and sale of complex financial instruments”). 
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undisclosed, unregulated securities that are known only to the parties 
involved.169  
Derivatives are contracts between counterparties to take certain ac-
tions based on the performance of some other, underlying security.170 
Their value then “derives” from the underlying security.171 Parties to 
derivatives can participate in financial gains and losses on other instru-
ments without ever investing in the underlying security.172 This allows 
investors to participate in investment returns at a much lower up-front 
cost.173 Derivatives can also help investors shift risk or insure themselves 
against some investment risk to which they are already exposed.174 Invest-
ment in derivatives is an important investment diversification strategy, 
and provides yet another opportunity for investors to define the terms 
and protections of their investment by contract and without regard to 
heavy federal regulation. 
All of the securities presented in this Part provide different levels of 
protection, risk, and return for investors. Well-diversified investors could 
invest in all of them and benefit from the various levels of protection. 
Investors may choose to invest in different places in one firm’s capital 
structure or can invest in both privately and publicly traded equity securi-
ties issued by different companies. Investors can also directly hedge 
against risks or take advantage of arbitrage opportunities at relatively low 
cost with derivatives. Overall, the various opportunities for diversification 
allow investors to invest in the same company in different ways, in differ-
ent companies with similar traits, or in different companies in different 
stages of their life cycles. The legal rules governing these securities corre-
late to the levels of risk and investor protections in important ways that 
allow investors to diversify across different investment characteristics 
more meaningfully. 
                                                                                                                 
169. See id. at 455 (describing role of credit rating agencies in creating and selling 
derivatives and proposed reforms to eliminate regulator dependence on ratings from 
these agencies). 
170. See id. at 403 (discussing two types of derivatives, options and forwards, 
representing two different types of obligations to take certain actions based on 
performance of underlying securities). 
171. Id. 
172. See id. at 404 (“Speculators frequently use derivatives as a more efficient or less 
costly means of getting financial exposure to the underlying asset.”). 
173. Id. 
174. See id. at 403–04 (describing hedging through example of farmer using futures 
or forwards to lock in price at which he will sell his wheat harvest at specified future date). 
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V. LEGAL DIVERSIFICATION AS A COMPLEMENT TO OTHER MARKET 
DIVERSITY PRIORITIES 
Mark Roe has argued that the American legal system has deliberately 
chosen a decentralized system of corporate and financial governance 
that consists of ownership and control widely dispersed among various 
investors, including institutional investors.175 He has pointed to many 
rules in the system that discourage or prohibit large institutional inves-
tors from owning controlling blocks in corporations.176 Recent regulation 
has continued to favor decentralization. The Dodd-Frank Act includes 
regulations that do even more to prevent banks from owning large por-
tions of the securities market and to decentralize investment to mitigate 
systemic risk.177 This focus on decentralization prevents a small number 
of institutions from controlling an outsize share of the U.S. capital mar-
kets and aims to protect investors from the systemic risk they cannot di-
versify away. Again, American corporate and financial laws have favored 
decentralization and diversity (in types of investors and investments) as a 
means of protecting the integrity of the financial markets, as well as miti-
gating the risk of catastrophic systemic failure, much in the way invest-
ment diversification does for individual investors.  
Scholars have recognized that society can realize similar benefits by 
promoting the decentralization of regulation. Some argue that securities 
regulation should be decentralized, or even privatized, so that individual 
jurisdictions (such as states or securities exchanges) can enact a variety of 
securities regulatory schemes, and that the resulting experimentation will 
reveal the optimal form of regulation.178 Others argue that securities laws 
should be stripped down significantly to regulate investors and allow 
those investors to make market choices about how they want companies 
to behave179 or to focus only on antifraud regulation to allow investors to 
                                                                                                                 
175. Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 Colum. L. 
Rev. 10, 11 (1991). 
176. Id. at 26–29 (outlining restrictions on control under Securities Exchange Act). 
177. See 12 U.S.C. § 1852 (2012) (mandating concentration limits on large financial 
firms); see also Michael S. Barr, The Financial Crisis and the Path of Reform, 29 Yale J. on 
Reg. 91, 99 (2012) (stating new Dodd-Frank amendments subject major firms to “new 
concentration limits, which will prohibit mergers or acquisitions that would result in one 
firm’s liabilities exceeding 10 percent of the liabilities of financial companies as a whole”). 
178. See Coates, supra note 11, at 532 (describing academic debate over devolution 
of securities regulation); see also Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable 
Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
903, 907 (1998) (proposing highly decentralized global regulation of capital markets); 
Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1453, 1455 (1997) 
(proposing decentralized regime with more authority devolved to securities exchanges); 
Romano, For Diversity, supra note 3, at 3 (advocating diversity in global securities 
regulation to reduce systemic risk). 
179. See, e.g., Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based 
Proposal, 88 Calif. L. Rev. 279, 280 (2000) (proposing less mandatory regulation for 
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negotiate with firms over other rights.180 In a similar vein, growing trends 
in the financial regulation literature illuminate the risk imposed by co-
ordinated regulation of financial firms and markets and urges diversity in 
that regulation to avoid the costs of too much coordination.181  
Legal diversification as a platform is consistent with, but distinct 
from, the goals of decentralization. Whereas decentralization promotes 
competition among legal regimes as a means of identifying optimal regu-
latory schemes, legal diversification promotes the proliferation of regula-
tory frameworks to mitigate the risk of financial loss associated with the 
failure of any one system. Rather than using diversity to find the best set 
of rules, legal diversification emphasizes the importance of making dif-
ferent legal rules available to issuers and investors as part of a wise in-
vestment strategy to mitigate the risk of financial loss associated with the 
failure of any one system to adequately protect investors. Because legal 
diversification is an important feature of investment in its own right, it 
should be an important goal of regulation. This Part situates legal diversi-
fication within the existing literature on law markets and coordination of 
financial regulation. It submits that promoting legal diversification 
should be an important regulatory objective.  
A. As Opposed to a Law Market 
Corporate law scholars have long thought in terms of law mar-
kets182—legal regimes with alternative rules that allow individuals or firms 
to choose which legal rules to adopt to govern their behavior.183 Individu-
als and firms can make this choice through decisions about where to live 
or where to organize, or by including choice of law or choice of forum 
terms in their contracts.184 Corporate law presents such a law market be-
cause it is a creature of state law.185 States can choose different corporate 
governance laws and firms can then choose where they want to incorpo-
                                                                                                                 
experienced investors with good information on risks and returns offered through 
particular issuers). 
180. See, e.g., Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 
1999 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1, 4 (advocating increased party choice in disclosure practices). 
181. See Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, supra note 3, at 326–27 (examining 
unintended costs of coordination of financial firms and markets); Romano, For Diversity, 
supra note 3, at 37–100 (advocating greater flexibility in international financial 
regulation). 
182. E.g., O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 3, at 107 (“Scholars have long studied the 
state competition for corporate law as a distinct phenomenon. The basic idea is that 
because U.S. companies can choose to incorporate in any state, states end up competing 
with one another for the provision of corporate laws.”). 
183. Id. at 3 (“Parties, in effect, can shop for law, just as they do for other goods.”). 
184. Id. at 107–08. 
185. Id.  
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rate. The theory is that firms (and investors) will gravitate toward the 
state with the most efficient laws.186 
The primary justification for allowing different states to have differ-
ent corporate laws rather than enacting a federal corporate law is that 
states can serve as individual legal laboratories, each trying out different 
legal rules.187 Firms will then choose to incorporate in the state offering 
the legal regime that allows them to be most profitable and, the theory 
goes, this law market will favor the states with the “best” corporate law.188 
Some have argued that the law market has resulted in a “race to the bot-
tom,” with states competing to have the corporate law that is most lenient 
for management because managers decide where to incorporate.189 Oth-
ers have dismissed this claim, arguing instead that Delaware law domi-
nates public corporations because it best serves that constituency.190 
Close corporations tend to incorporate in their home jurisdictions, but 
larger firms can shop for the right jurisdiction and a large plurality 
choose Delaware.191  
While this Essay will not directly address the state corporate law 
market or competition among states for incorporations, the principles at 
work in that market provide a useful complement to the legal diversifica-
tion proposed here. The argument that a system can discover optimal 
legal rules by trying several different rules in different jurisdictions leads 
to the conclusion that it can reach better rules through variety and flexi-
bility than by trying one rule at a time. Managers choose to organize un-
der certain governance rules based on their estimation of which rules 
best suit their business purposes. Investors can then vote on whether they 
think the firms have made the right choice by investing in firms that 
                                                                                                                 
186. Id. 
187. Romano, The States as a Laboratory, supra note 3, at 210. 
188. Id. at 214. 
189. See William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law’s 
Continuing Success, 2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1, 74–75 (arguing Delaware corporate law no 
longer possesses many superior qualities enabling it to continue dominating legal market); 
William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 Yale L.J. 
663, 668–69 (1974) (stating Delaware’s aim is to create comfortable environment for 
management in order to attract incorporations). 
190. See Romano, The States as a Laboratory, supra note 3, at 213 (arguing 
Delaware’s success is due in part to responsiveness to corporate interests); see also Roberta 
Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 Cardozo L. Rev. 709, 720–23 
(1987) (providing various reasons large number of firms choose to incorporate in 
Delaware); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the 
Corporation, 6 J. Legal Stud. 251, 256 (1977) (rejecting William Cary’s “race to the 
bottom” argument and claiming firms will always choose state whose laws are most 
favorable to shareholders in order to protect stock value). 
191. See O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 3, at 120 (“[A]bout half of larger closely held 
corporations . . . incorporate outside their principal place of business (the majority in 
Delaware) . . . .”); Romano, The States as a Laboratory, supra note 3, at 213 (noting many 
large firms are incorporated in Delaware). 
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seem to have opted in to the most efficient regimes. The law market en-
courages variety—and acknowledges that firms and investors make im-
portant choices in the face of that variety—and so is a useful predicate to 
the notion of legal diversification.  
The availability of different business forms also exposes investors to 
different methods of constraining agency costs. Investing simultaneously 
in a variety of governance regimes may allow an investor to participate in 
the experimentation a law market encourages. Through legally diversi-
fied investment, an investor will find different levels of optimal apathy 
that a particular firm’s governance regime allows. For example, an inves-
tor would have to be more actively involved in an investment in a private 
general partnership than she would in a public corporation, and may 
find an intermediate level of engagement and monitoring is appropriate 
in a private, closely held corporation. As firms tinker with what govern-
ance mechanisms work best for them, they find the most effective ways to 
reduce agency costs. A legally diversified investor may be able to diversify 
away some of the firm-specific risks of agency costs, or even the agency 
costs inherent in a particular governance form.  
Legal diversification within one legal system is different than a law 
market across different jurisdictions, however. Legal diversification en-
courages a single investor to take advantage of a broad range of legal 
rules at once. Because these legal rules are available to a single investor, 
they are considered, for the purposes of this Essay, to be within the same 
system. The legally diversified investor does not try to discover and invest 
in only the “best” legal rule, but rather invests in firms and securities 
governed by a wide variety of rules, in part because she is not sure which 
rules are “best.” So, while scholars might think of individual states com-
peting on the basis of the business association laws they offer, a U.S. in-
vestor could simultaneously invest in a number of companies subject to a 
variety of state business association laws. The relevant system, then, is the 
U.S. securities markets, both public and private.192 The variety within the 
system helps investors by allowing them to take advantage of the efficien-
cies offered by the different sets of legal rules.  
The law market, on the other hand, focuses more on allowing inves-
tors to choose a favorite among a variety of legal rules. The goal is to find 
the most efficient set of legal rules through revealed investor prefer-
ences. A law market does not value diversity as an end in itself, but only 
as it helps society discover the optimal set of rules, supposing an optimal 
set of rules, or optimal rule, exists. A law market can coexist with a system 
                                                                                                                 
192. Of course, a U.S. investor could also legally diversify by investing in foreign 
markets. See Brummer, supra note 6, at 1462 (“[S]peed also makes trading on foreign 
markets not only possible but practical.”). This Essay focuses instead on the U.S. system 
because a goal of the Essay is to show the importance of maintaining a variety of legal rules 
within the U.S. capital markets. 
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that prioritizes legal diversification because both value legal diversity. 
Legal diversity is an important independent goal within an understand-
ing of legal diversification because it allows legal rules to evolve over time 
to adapt to changing and unpredictable circumstances. States can com-
pete over who has the most efficient LLC-organizing statutes, but inves-
tors will still benefit from being able to invest in LLCs as well as other 
business forms, and may even benefit from being able to invest in LLCs 
in two different states, particularly as it remains uncertain what “good” or 
“the best” LLC law may be. 
B. A Complement to Diversity in Financial Regulation 
In another adaptation of the argument that diversity should be 
maintained as a regulatory priority, a recent scholarly movement has ad-
vocated diversity in financial risk regulation.193 From slightly different 
perspectives, Roberta Romano and Charles Whitehead have argued that 
diversity in regulation best manages financial risk, particularly as the risks 
both faced and imposed by financial firms can be so unpredictable and 
difficult to understand.194 The overall theme of this line of reasoning is 
that world markets are best protected from financial risktaking when 
diversity of regulation within an individual country’s market is encour-
aged and the markets of different countries are regulated by completely 
different regimes. Whitehead focuses on the effects of regulatory coordi-
nation on systemic risk within the U.S. financial markets.195 He points out 
that using the same metrics to regulate all financial firms may cause them 
to coordinate their actions to the detriment of the system as a whole.196 
Romano builds on Whitehead’s insights and argues that international 
financial markets should be regulated by a diverse set of laws adminis-
                                                                                                                 
193. See Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, supra note 3, at 326 (“By promoting 
coordination, regulations and standards can erode key presumptions underlying financial 
risk management, reducing its effectiveness and magnifying the systemic impact of a 
downturn in the financial markets.”); Romano, For Diversity, supra note 3, at 3 (“This 
article . . . challenges the present-day enthusiasm for international regulatory 
harmonization and the view that harmonization is a panacea for reducing systemic risk 
and advances . . . the need for a more flexible financial architecture that provides greater 
room for regulatory diversity and experimentation . . . .”). 
194. See Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, supra note 3, at 325–28 (noting 
potentially destructive nature of coordination); Romano, For Diversity, supra note 3, at 3–
9 (arguing need for flexibility and experimentation). 
195. See Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, supra note 3, at 325–26 (explaining 
role of coordination and regulation in banking). 
196. See id. at 326–28 (“[G]reater coordination impair[s] each firm’s ability to 
manage its own risk exposure. In short, although regulation and market standards can 
help reduce systemic risk, they themselves can also become a systemic risk.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
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tered by different countries.197 Her argument follows the familiar law 
market reasoning: Future financial risks are unknown, so it makes sense 
to try a variety of laws. This would allow for the comparison and reevalua-
tion of regulatory choices so that different regimes could learn from 
each other and the entire system would not collapse if one regulatory 
regime proved ineffective.198 
These ideas relate and contribute to legal diversification in different 
ways. For instance, Romano’s idea is that the entire world economy can 
avoid vulnerability to a single crisis or failure if different ways of con-
fronting risk can be adopted.199 Diversity of regulation allows 
experimentation and tailoring. If different regimes operate simultane-
ously, it may be easier to switch more quickly from a bad one to a good 
one as the community learns how to improve its responses to unforesee-
able problems. There is more flexibility, then, once the community 
acknowledges different regimes can be effective, especially if firms and 
investors are allowed to choose the rules that will govern them. 
Legal diversification capitalizes on the diversification available within 
one system and offers an application of Romano’s global point within the 
U.S. legal system. John Coates has pointed out that there is a good deal 
of diversity within the securities and corporate governance system.200 
Investors and issuers have plenty of legal rules to choose among in de-
signing their portfolios.201 More is known about corporate governance 
and securities regulation than about international financial risk, but the 
perfect way to minimize agency costs has not yet been devised. While it is 
still not known how managers may fail or be unfaithful, the flexibility 
provided by different legal regimes allows a quicker and more appropri-
ate response to those failures. That flexibility arises from the ability to 
quickly switch to a regime that works better by moving investments there. 
If a number of systems work simultaneously to try to respond to various 
agency costs and one fails, an investor can choose to invest in firms gov-
erned by the more effective regime. The legal rules that are better at lim-
iting agency costs may also be helpful by giving examples of how to im-
                                                                                                                 
197. See Romano, For Diversity, supra note 3, at 3 (“This article . . . challenges the 
present-day enthusiasm for international regulatory harmonization and . . . advances an 
alternative regulatory solution. The focus is the need for a more flexible financial 
architecture that provides greater room for regulatory diversity and 
experimentation . . . .”). 
198. See id. at 5–8 (“The diversity mechanism would have decisive benefits over the 
present-day . . . framework for improving the quality of financial regulatory 
decisionmaking. It would increase not only the flexibility but also the adaptability and 
consequently, the resilience of the international financial regulatory architecture.”). 
199. See id. (noting diversity can mitigate risk of future crises). 
200. Coates, supra note 11, at 543, 550–53 (“[E]xisting law provides for far more 
issuer choice about the level and nature of securities disclosure regulation than devolution 
proponents have acknowledged . . . .”). 
201. See id. (noting current rules provide numerous flexible obligations). 
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prove governance in other kinds of firms. The failed regime may be able 
to adopt those more efficient rules more quickly if it is apparent how the 
superior rules work and are implemented than if courts and legislatures 
have to try to innovate on the spot. Legislative change takes a long 
time,202 but allowing multiple systems to operate simultaneously may al-
low the system to respond more quickly and efficiently to ineffective legal 
rules. Encouraging investors to stake out different roles in limiting 
agency costs, and to protect themselves in different ways through differ-
ent investments, allows them to directly benefit from the relative ad-
vantages of different sets of legal rules. 
Romano’s argument builds on Whitehead’s observation about the 
nature of financial risk: that the “random walk” of stock prices and lack 
of coordination among financial actors are important to a market’s 
health and ability to absorb risk.203 Uniform regulation can undermine 
the “random walk” and result in “destructive coordination.”204 
Whitehead’s piece focuses much more specifically on the nature of fi-
nancial risk, particularly the paradox presented when financial market 
participants uniformly adopt the same risk management technique that 
itself assumes randomness.205 When all of the financial firms coordinate 
in their risk assessment, the necessary randomness is compromised and 
risk evaluation is therefore much less effective and reliable.206  
While the particular points Whitehead makes about risk manage-
ment do not necessarily apply to governance and securities regulation, 
the intuition does. By pushing business firms and investors into a single, 
uniform investment option, the “random walk” that the market supposes 
is lost. Legal diversification provides another way for investors to respond 
to different market shocks in different ways. The more difficult it is to 
legally diversify, the harder it will be for investors to diversify away the 
risks associated with a particular kind of investment. An important lesson 
from Romano’s and Whitehead’s insights, and indeed the primary lesson 
from the 2008 financial crisis, is to not put all of one’s eggs in one basket. 
Legal diversification is yet another way to avoid this mistake. 
                                                                                                                 
202. See id. at 562–63 (noting legislative change can take up to three years). 
203. See Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, supra note 3, at 336–37 (“Much of 
modern financial economics is premised on a world without coordination. Rational 
individuals separately seek to maximize wealth, each guided by their own self-interest. The 
. . . result is an optimal allocation of resources to those who can use them most 
productively.”). 
204. See id. at 330 (“[I]ndividual portfolio managers act independently and . . . their 
actions affect neither asset prices nor the actions of others.”). 
205. See id. (“[I]n a world that presumes randomness, regulation and market 
standards that promote coordination can also be destructive.”). 
206. See id. at 347, 352–58 (noting uniformity of investor response to recent Bear 
Stearns crisis increased “downward spiral” and uniform financial regulation “can increase 
systemic risk”). 
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VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF LEGAL DIVERSIFICATION 
Recent securities legislation has the potential to either expand or 
contract the legal diversity available to issuers and investors. As discussed 
above, the JOBS Act contains some provisions that would entice compa-
nies to go public, but it also contains others that make it easier for some 
firms to remain private. If more firms remain private, that should pro-
mote legal diversity, while pushing more firms into public corporation 
status would undermine diversity. Policymakers should be aware of 
whether they are promoting or stunting legal diversity. Where the opti-
mal legal rule has not yet been discovered, or where multiple rules may 
be necessary to serve the relevant population, legal diversity should be 
maintained and encouraged. 
In addition to the on-ramp to public corporation status,207 the JOBS 
Act also includes provisions that will make it easier for some firms to stay 
private by increasing the number of accredited investors to whom a firm 
can issue securities without entering the public disclosure regime.208 The 
JOBS Act also removes the ban on general solicitation to accredited in-
vestors in certain private offerings.209 These provisions make it much eas-
ier for a firm to generate unlimited capital from a great many accredited 
investors without going public. If firms use the large umbrella provided 
by these new provisions to avoid going public, then they will have more 
flexibility in choosing their business form when organizing and raising 
capital.  
The intermediate form of public reporting provided to EGCs can 
also create an avenue for diversity. If it is observed that the limited disclo-
sures EGCs provide are sufficient for companies of that size, Congress 
could well decide to make the intermediate level of public reporting 
permanent. Creating another level of public firm would increase diversity 
and provide grounds to experiment with a different level of disclosure in 
order to determine what the optimal level of disclosure for firms and in-
vestors is. Of course, it is uncertain what the most common result of the 
JOBS Act will be, but there are opportunities to increase diversity and, 
given the trouble the public corporate form has had in recent decades, it 
seems likely firms and investors would benefit from that diversity. 
                                                                                                                 
207. See supra notes 72–78 and accompanying text (noting JOBS Act aims to bring 
more companies into public status). 
208. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 501, 126 Stat. 
306, 325 (2012) (describing threshold for registration of private companies). 
209. See id. § 201(a)(1), 126 Stat. at 313–15 (“[T]he prohibition against general 
solicitation or general advertising contained in section 230.502(c) of such title shall not 
apply to offers and sales of securities made pursuant to section 230.506, provided that all 
purchasers of the securities are accredited investors.”). See generally Thompson & 
Langevoort, Redrawing, supra note 41 (discussing provisions of JOBS Act). 
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Legal diversification has implications for investment and policymak-
ing beyond corporate and securities law. Investors need not limit their 
legal diversification to corporate governance rules or securities laws. In 
any area of law where jurisdictions are able to legislate independently 
and firms are subject to different rules governing similar circumstances, 
legal diversity may be helpful, and investors may be able to diversify along 
those dimensions in choosing investments. Policymakers could also take 
this broader view and, when uncertain what the best path may be, could 
design in negative correlations between policy outcomes—that is, enact 
directly opposed policies in different jurisdictions in order to determine 
which works best, meanwhile enjoying the hedging of risk that diversifi-
cation allows.210 If one policy fails, the other will not, so society and inves-
tors are protected from the total loss one failed policy may cause while 
enjoying the advantage of being able to experiment with different rules. 
Seen this way, the framework legal diversification provides could help 
answer a number of questions about how best to invest and legislate. 
CONCLUSION 
In order to have truly well-diversified portfolios, investors must be 
able to invest in firms and securities that are governed by a variety of le-
gal rules. Firms organize into particular business forms, each form gov-
erned by a different set of legal rules. Later, when raising capital, firms 
issue various securities, each giving investors particular rights against the 
firm’s assets and protections from agency costs and informational asym-
metries. Thus, these legal rules respond to distinct risks firms impose on 
investors and offer investors different protections. Investors can protect 
themselves more completely from the risk of the failure of any one set of 
legal rules by investing in firms and securities that are governed by dif-
ferent rules. In this way, investors can realize some of the benefits of in-
vestment diversification through legal diversification, or diversification 
across the legal rules governing investments. 
The U.S. capital markets are currently home to a variety of legal 
rules governing firms and their securities, so investors have a broad, var-
ied menu to choose from in constructing a legally diversified portfolio. 
The JOBS Act threatens this variety, however, by enticing firms to take an 
on-ramp to public corporation status earlier in their life cycles than they 
otherwise might. This increases the stickiness of the public corporation 
default by pushing more firms toward that one regulatory regime. The 
more firms opt into public corporation status, the less legal variety inves-
tors will have to choose from in fully diversifying investment. Different 
firms have different governance and capital requirements, so they should 
be able to choose the rules that are most efficient for their goals and cir-
                                                                                                                 
210. The author is grateful to David Schleicher for this insight. 
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cumstances. That way, investors can invest in a portfolio of securities rep-
resenting a variety of firms in different stages, thriving under different 
circumstances, or pursuing different business objectives. Regulatory vari-
ety protects investors and maintains efficiency in legal rules that govern 
firms. 
Diversity in regulation is a prominent theme in recent corporate law 
scholarship. However, no one has focused on the advantages of legal di-
versification for investors, or even acknowledged that legal diversification 
should be a distinct investment and regulatory priority. Maintaining vari-
ety in the rules that govern businesses benefits investors, issuers, and so-
ciety. Diversifying investment across legal rules is vitally important to the 
ability of investors to take advantage of their greatest protection from 
risk: diversification. 
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